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LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT:
THE MEANING OF BAKER V. CARR

Jo Desha Lucas*
three recent cases the Supreme Court has reopened the question of the extent to which federal courts will review the
general fairness of state schemes of legislative apportionment. It
is a question on which the Court has had nothing to say for over
a decade, leaving the bar to patch together the current state of
the law from the outcome of cases disposed of without opinion
considered against a backdrop of language used in earlier decisions.

I

N

I.

BAKER

v.

CARR

In Baker v. Carr there was full atonement for past laconism.
There were six opinions, totalling some 50,000 words, and the
case was returned to the district court with an order to hear it
on the merits, suggesting that there are more to come. A simple
theme has not undergone such exhaustive exploration since the
publication of Beethoven's "Thirty-three Variations on a Waltz
by Diabelli."
Baker was a suit brought in a three-judge district court seeking a declaration that the retention in 1961 of the scheme provided by the Tennessee Legislative Apportionment Act of 1901,2
contrary to provisions of the state constitution,8 violated the Constitution of the United States in that it resulted in under-representation of districts of greatly increased population, thus depriving
the residents of such districts of equal protection of the laws. 4
The defendants, election officials of the state of Tennessee, moved
to dismiss on three grounds: first, want of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; second, failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted; and third, absence of indispensable parties. 6 The
district court granted the motion and dismissed the bill. In a per
curiam opinion, it conceded that the state constitution and the
"rights" of the plaintiffs had been violated by the failure of the
1

• Professor of Law, University of Chicago.-Ed.
U.S. 186 (1962).
2 Acrs OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE ch. 122 (1901).
3 TENN. CONST. art. II, §§ 3-6.
~ U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
li Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

1 369

[7ll]
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Tennessee legislature to reapportion, but, after reviewing the
Supreme Court decisions from Colegrove v. Green6 to Matthews
v. Handley, 7 read those cases as precluding intervention on the
part of federal courts, and went on to suggest that the case at bar
illustrated the wisdom of the rule of non-intervention.8 Quoting
from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Colegrove v. Green,
the court gave other examples of political controversies into which
the federal courts had refused to intrude.0 On appeal, the Supreme
Court held that the question was within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts and was not a non-justiciable "political question," reversing the district court and remanding the case for a
decision on the merits of the constitutional claim.10
Similar attempts to invalidate state statutes apportioning political influence among the state's geographically-defined political
subdivisions had been before the Supreme Court fifteen times in
the past thirty years, all unsuccessfully.11 To show that the district court should try Baker v. Carr12 on the merits it was necessary to dispose of these decisions.
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
361 U.S. 127 (1959).
8 The Court referred to earlier litigation of the same issues by the Supreme Court
of Tennessee. See Kidd v. Mccanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40, appeal dismissed,
352 U.S. 920 (1956). See discussion of Kidd v. McCanless in the text infra at 736-37.
o Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824, 828 (M.D. Tenn. 1959). See Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. at 556.
10 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
11 Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958);
Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); Kidd v. Mccanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956); Anderson
v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); Remmey v. Smith, 342
U.S. 916 (1952); Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950); South v. Peters,
339 U.S. 276 (1950); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330
U.S. 804 (1946); Cook v. Fortson (Turman v. Duckworth), 329 U.S. 675 (1946); Colegrove
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932). It has sometimes been
suggested that there may be a constitutionally significant distinction between cases dealing with congressional apportionment and those which treat of representation in the
state legislatures. See, e.g., Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitu•
tion, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 329, 339-40, 344 (1962). There is language in the Frankfurter opinion in Colegrove v. Green which lends support to this view, for there it is
said, at 554: "The short of it is that ••. the subject has been committed to the exclusive
control of Congress." It should be noted, however, that this language was rejected by
Mr. Justice Rutledge, whose vote was necessary to the disposition of the case, that it
has never been repeated by the Court, and that Colegrove v. Green was coupled with
Colegrove v. Barrett (dealing with state representation) in disposing of MacDougall v.
Green (dealing with presidential electors). Indeed, the distinction may be looked upon as
an effort to distinguish Colegrove v. Green; it is highly unlikely that it will be advocated
with much fervor in preserving the Colegrove doctrine in congressional apportionment.
See, e.g., Black, Inequities in Districting for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrove v.
Green, 72 YALE L.J. 13 (1962).
12 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
6

7
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A. The Majority Opinion: Disposing of Colegrove
and Its Progeny
Mr. Justice Brennan, in writing the Court's majority opinion
in which the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Black joined, first
characterized the opinion of the district court as conceding the
violation of rights guaranteed the plaintiffs by the Constitution
of the United States13 and proceeding upon the assumption either
that the subject matter was not within the jurisdiction of the court,
or that, although within the subject-matter jurisdiction, the issues
were nevertheless political matters by their nature non-justiciable.
After considering each of these grounds in turn, he concluded that
both assumptions were unsupported by prior Supreme Court decisions.14
The question of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
controversy is hardly worth the discussion it has received. True,.
there is language in the Frankfurter opinion in the Colegrove
decision15 to the effect that the direct grant to the states to control
the time, manner, and place of holding elections for congressmen,
coupled with a power of revision vested in Congress and a power
in Congress to serve as sole judge of the election of its members,16
indicates an intention to take questions of congressional apportionment out of the jurisdiction of courts of law. It is doubtful if
this language can be taken as suggesting that apportionment problems are outside the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts in the sense that they are not within the constitutional
definition of the judicial power. As Mr. Justice Clark pointed out
ill Baker v. Carr,17 Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Justices who
signed his Colegrove opinion first held that the dispute was governed by Wood v. Broom,18 and in Wood the Supreme Court had
not questioned the jurisdiction, but on the contrary had reversed
the district court on the merits. In any event, the matter has often
been litigated without serious doubt as to jurisdiction. After all,
the claim is that the equal protection clause prohibits geographical
discrimination in the allocation of representatives in the state legislature. That such a claim is within the subject matter committed
to the Court seems beyond dispute.
13 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 197.
14 Id. at 237.
15 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
16 Id. at 554.
17 369 U.S. at 252.
18 287 U.S. l (1932).

See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. at 551.
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As to the justiciability of the questions, the easy answer is
that in several cases such matters have been adjudicated and decided upon the merits. Again, there is language to the contrary
in the Frankfurter opinion in Colegrove, and language in South
v. Peters19 which could be taken as indicating that the issues were
non-justiciable, but the stark fact stands out that in MacDougall
v. Green20 a very similar issue was adjudicated, and the disposition
of causes in several other cases was antithetical to the suggestion
that the questions are beyond judicial determination.21
In a separate opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart stated that the
majority opinion went no further than holding simply that the
matters involved in Baker v. Garr constituted a subject matter within the jurisdiction of the district courts, and that they
were not non-justiciable "political questions," saving until the
time at which there might be occasion to review the case on the
merits the question of the extent to which the equal protection
clause prohibits rural bias in legislative apportionment.22 If Mr.
Justice Stewart was accurate in this view of what the majority
opinion held, there can be little quarrel with its correctness. In
the context of the Baker case, however, it would be idle to demonstrate the justiciability of the controversy by showing that such
controversies have often been decided on the merits, if in this
process it becomes apparent that they were all decided in a manner adverse to the contention of the Baker plaintiffs. So, as Mr.
Justice Brennan proceeded to distinguish the fourteen pertinent
Supreme Court decisions since 1932,23 ostensibly simply to show
that they do not hold the issues non-justiciable, he used consummate care to avoid the implication that in any of them the Court
had decided the merits of the constitutional right asserted in the
case at bar. At the start it should be stated that these decisions
cannot be distinguished on the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, for
not only have nearly identical claims been before the Court24 on
19 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
20 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
21 E.g., Wood v. Broom,

287 U.S. I (1932). See also Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355
(1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932); Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932).
22 369 U.S. at 265.
23 See cases cited in note 11 supra.
24 The facts in Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1946), are very similar, if not
identical. In the Barrett case the statute under attack was the Illinois Apportionment
Act of 1901 [ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 150, 152 (1961)] enacted the same y~r that the
Tennessee act under attack in Baker v. Carr was passed, and based upon the same cen•
sus (that of 1900). The Illinois provision was, therefore, forty-six years old at the time
the Barrett case brought, while in Baker v. Carr the Tennessee act was sixty. In
Illinois, by 1940, the largest senate district was roughly sixteen times as populous as the
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several occasions, but the precise statute challenged as unconstitutional in Baker was before the Court in an earlier case.25
Wood v. Broom26 was disposed of in a footnote quoting from
Mr. Justice Rutledge's opinion in Colegrove v. Green, to the
effect that the Wood case decided no constitutional questions, but
"the Court disposed of the cause on the ground that the 1929 Reapportionment Act ... did not carry forward the requirements of
the 1911 Act ... , and declined to decide whether there was equity
in the bill."27 The Brennan opinion continued, "We agree with
this view of Wood v. Broom."28 Certainly from the vantage point
of 1946, when Mr. Justice Rutledge delivered his opinion in Colegrove, Wood v. Broom was not strong precedent, inasmuch as the
Court did not discuss the point of an equal protection right to
equality of representation unaided by an act of Congress. The
claim was grounded upon this contention, however, as well as
upon the statute, a fact noted by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in his
opinion. 20 This was explained away by the Colegrove plaintiffs
as illustrating the principle that where relief is sought on two
grounds and granted on one of them, and the ground upon which
relief is granted proves to be erroneous, the appellate court will
smallest, with one senator elected from each district. In Tennessee, house and senate
districts are combined for application of Mr. Justice Clark's representative quotient.
By this method, he determined that the differences were in the order of 100 to I. In
South v. Peters, however, the differences were conceded to be of that order. See text
infra at 723-24.
25 Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956). The Mccanless case was an appeal from
the Supreme Court of Tennessee. See text infra at 736.
26 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
27 328 U.S. at 565. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Justice Rutledge placed
his willingness to dismiss for lack of equity on the ground that the elections were to be
held shortly and it was doubtful if effective relief could be given. In Wood v. Broom,
the four Justices who voted to reverse and dismiss the bill for want of equity were
dealing with a case in which relief had been granted, and in which there was a permanent injunction outstanding. Accordingly, there was no problem about the efficacy
of relief. Nor was there, presumably, any feeling that the relief granted was in any
way inappropriate or would create local chaos. The same relief had been granted in
the previous term in Smiley v. Holm, Koenig v. Flynn, and Carroll v. Becker. In this
connection, it is interesting to note that, after the granting of the injunction below,
the defendants applied to Mr. Justice Cardozo for supersedeas. The application was
denied in an opinion which pointed out that both the laws of Mississippi and those of
the United States provided for special elections to fill vacancies, and, as a consequence,
it could be said that no irreparable harm would result from permitting the injunction
to stay in force until the matter could be settled on the merits. See Record, p. 35,
Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
28 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 234 n.59.
20 Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. at 4: "The alleged grounds of invalidity were that the
act violated Art. I, § 4, and the Fourteenth Amendment, of the Constitution of the
United States, and § 3 of the Act of Congress of August 8, 1911 ...•"
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reverse the judgment without considering the other ground. It
is said there that the Lawyers Edition headnote to Wood v. Broom
explains the case in that fashion. 30 Of course the headnote referred
to says no such thing. It says, instead, that where relief is granted
on a ground which on appeal proves to be erroneous, the Court
will refuse to rule on the question of whether or not the plaintiff
would have been entitled to relief had the ground on which it had
been granted been upheld on appeal.31 This is an accurate statement of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes's opinion.
In Colegrove v. Green, said Mr. Justice Brennan, "the Court
followed [Smiley v. Holm, 32 Koenig v. Flynn, 33 and Carroll v.
Becker34] • • • although over the dissent of three of the seven J ustices who participated in that decision." He went on to say that
"indeed, the refusal to award relief in Colegrove resulted only
from the controlling view of a want of equity." 35
The first of these statements is somewhat misleading. The
Court did not follow the precedents in Smiley, Koenig, and Carroll. In those cases the constitutional issue was decided on the
merits and relief was granted. In Colegrove v. Green, the most
that can be said is that four members of the Court expressed an
opinion that the issues were justiciable. Though Mr. Justice Rutledge expressed his agreement with Justices Black, Douglas and
Murphy in their view that the Court was empowered to decide
the constitutional question, he expressly refused to reach it, for
his view of dismissal for want of equity was one of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions. 36 So while four members of the
seven-man Court thought the issues were justiciable, the Court
did not hold them to be so, nor did it follow the precedents said
to demonstrate their justiciability. It dismissed the appeal. Since
the persuasion of Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge
on this issue had no connection with the outcome of the case, it
remains what it was-an expression of opinion by a minority of
the full Court.
30

S

Brief for the Better Government Association as Amicus Curiae, p. 69, Colegrove

v. Gree_,, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
31 See 77 L. Ed. 131 (1932), headnote 2: "Where it appears that the ground on which
injunction was granted below does not exist, the Supreme Court of the United States
will not consider the right of the complainant to relief in equity upon the allegations
of the complaint or the justiciability of the controversy, assuming such ground to exist."
32 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
33 285 U.S. 375 (1932).
34 285 U.S. 380 (1932).
35 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 232, 234.
36 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. at 564.
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The second statement is simply incorrect. Since Mr. Justice
Rutledge did not reach the issues of substantive constitutional law,
there is no warrant for saying that, absent the prevailing view of
want of equity, relief would have been afforded to the Colegrove
plaintiffs. All that can be said along this line is that, absent the
prevailing view of want of equity, the claim of constitutional deprivation would have been decided. Mr. Justice Rutledge gave
no hint as to which way he would vote on such a claim. As a consequence one cannot say whether or not relief would have been
granted.
Having thus disposed of the two cases in which there were
signed opinions, Mr. Justice Brennan turned to the per curiam
decisions. Of the first of these, Cook v. Fortson (Turman v. Duckworth ),37 he said that the appeals there were dismissed as moot.
In this he was correct, although in disposing of them the Court
cited Colegrove v. Green as well as United States v. Anchor Coal
Co.38 "MacDougall v. Green,"39 he continued, "held only that in
that case equity would not act to void the State's requirement that
there be at least a minimum of support for nominees for state-wide
office, over at least a minimal area of the State." 40 MacDougall
arose out of the efforts of the Progressive Party to run a slate of
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, as
well as candidates for local offices, in Illinois in the election of
1948. Under applicable provisions of the Illinois election laws,
new parties were required to file a petition containing the signatures of twenty-five thousand qualified voters, including at least
two hundred qualified voters from each of at least fifty of the state's
one hundred and two counties. The Progressive Party submitted
such a petition with the requisite total number of signatures. The
petition did not meet the requirement of two hundred each from
at least fifty counties, and, as a consequence, the election officials
refused to print the names of its candidates and electors on the
official ballot. MacDougall involved a suit brought before a threejudge district court to require them to do so. The court dismissed
the cause for want of jurisdiction, citing no precedents, and the
plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. In a short per curiam
329 U.S. 675 (1946).
279 U.S. 812 (1929) (on the subject of mootness). The Anchor Coal case was not
exactly in point, but made reference to dismissals of appeals for mootness. In the case
itself there was an outstanding injunction and the court held that the proper disposition
was to reverse the lower court and vacate its judgment.
30 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
40 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 234-35.
37
38
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opinion the Supreme Court affirmed. The opinion read, in part,
as follows:
"To assume that political power is a function exclusively of
numbers is to disregard the practicalities of government.
Thus, the Constitution protects the interests of the smaller
against the greater by giving in the Senate entirely unequal
representation to populations. It would be strange indeed,
and doctrinaire, for this Court, applying such broad constitutional concepts as due process and equal protection of the
laws, to deny a State the power to assure a proper diffusion
of political initiative as between its thinly populated counties and those having concentrated masses, in view of the fact
that the latter have practical opportunities for exerting their
political weight at the polls not available to the former. The
Constitution-a practical instrument of government-makes
no such demands on the States." 41
Mr. Justice Brennan's characterization of the case, if the phrase
in his opinion indicating that in MacDougall the Court "held only
that in that case equity would not act" 42 can be interpreted as suggesting that the cause was disposed of by reference to some equitable consideration such as time, relief, or the like, is clearly wrong.
We know this, first, because of the clear and unambiguous language
of the opinion: "The Constitution . . . makes no such demands
on the States."43 We know it also because Mr. Justice Rutledge
wrote a concurring opinion in which he reiterated his view that
constitutional questions should be avoided where possible and
indicated that he would follow the same procedure he had suggested in Colegrove and dismiss the appeal on the discretionary
ground of want of equity. He saw in the case the same factors of
time and doubt about the ability to give effective relief as he had
seen in Colegrove.44 The difference between Colegrove v. Green
and MacDougall v. Green was in the fact that the latter was heard
by a full Court and the majority did not need the vote of Mr.
Justice Rutledge. Rutledge was under no doubt that the case
was decided on the merits and his concurrence was written to
demonstrate his disagreement.
The MacDougall majority cited Colegrove v. Green and ColeMacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. at 283-84.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 234.
MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. at 284. (Emphasis added.)
To avoid confusion, Colegrove has been used to designate Colegrove v. Green,
Barrett to designate Colegrove v. Barrett, and MacDougall for MacDougall v. Green.
41
42
43
44
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grove v. Barrett as authority for the proposition that the Constitution makes no demand on the states that they refrain from
assuring a proper diffusion of political initiative as between their
thinly-populated counties and those with concentrated masses. 45
The Barrett case was, in a way, a non-identical twin of Colegrove v. Green. They were successive steps in the long legal
battle to force the state of Illinois to reapportion. The Illinois
General Assembly reapportioned the legislature and congressional
districts in the year 1901. For the next three censuses it did nothing, and, because of the very rapid growth of the city of Chicago,
congressional, state senate and General Assembly districts became
greatly different in population. Efforts to enlist the aid of the
Illinois courts to require the General Assembly to reapportion
state senate and General Assembly districts were three times rejected by the state supreme court, which refused mandamus to
compel reapportionment,46 refused to declare invalid acts adopted
by the General Assembly on the alleged ground that the members
of the General Assembly did not constitute a de jure legislature,47
and refused to unseat members in a quo warranto proceeding.48
In 1931, the General Assembly enacted a new congressional apportionment act. 49 Although the new act embodied smaller differentials in representation ratios than existed by this time under
the act of 1901, the districts were nonetheless far from equal in
population, the largest containing 541,785 inhabitants and the
smallest 158,738, a difference of roughly three to one.50 An action
was brought to enjoin the expenditure of money to hold the
congressional election of 1932 under the provisions of the act of
1931, and the state supreme court sustained the contentions that
the act violated both the Congressional Apportionment Act of
1911, and the provisions of the constitution of Illinois. 51 To the
horror of the plaintiffs, however, it went on to hold that since the
act of 1931 was unconstitutional and void, the applicable provision was the act of 1901, under which the districts varied from
914,053 to 112,116, a difference of over eight to one. 52 An action
41'i MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. at 283-84.
46 Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill. 510, 152 N.E. 557 (1926). See SEARS, METHODS OF REAPPOR·
TIONlllENT 4-ll (1952). Other Illinois cases failing to grant relief are listed in the complaint in Colegrove v. Barrett (unreported), No. 46, C 1946, N.D. Ill.
47 Fergus v. Kinney, 333 Ill. 437, 164 N.E. 665 (1928).
48 People ex rel. Fergus v. Blackwell, 342 Ill. 223, 173 N.E. 750 (1930).
40 LAws OF THE STATE OF ILUNOIS 545 (1931).
r;o See Moran v. Bowley, 347 III. 148, 150, 179 N.E. 526,527 (1932).
151 Ibid.
152 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. at 557.
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was then brought seeking to invalidate the 1901 act. Meanwhile
the Supreme Court of the United States decided Wood v. Broom.
The Illinois supreme court then held that the federal ground
which sustained its earlier decision was withdrawn by that case
and, reversing itself on the state constitutional ground, refused
to interfere. 53 It was at this point that Colegrove v. Greenr, 4 was
filed, seeking the aid of the federal courts. After losing in that case
by a three-one-three decision, Colegrove v. Barrett 55 was brought,
attacking in the federal courts the Illinois state senate apportionment. One may well ask how it could be assumed by Illinois franchise reformers that a suit attacking the validity of the state
senate apportionment would be successful where attack on congressional apportionment had failed. It must be remembered,
however, that in Colegrove v. Green they had lost by one vote,
and that vote was cast on the ground of lack of equity stemming at
least partially from the individual facts of time. It must also be
remembered that Colegrove v. Green mustered no majority of a
full court and that, by the time Colegrove v. Barrett was filed, Mr.
Chief Justice Vinson and Mr. Justice Jackson were sitting. The
district court dismissed for want of equity, without opinion, presumably relying upon the ground given in Colegrove v. Green. On
appeal the Supreme Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, Mr. Justice Rutledge putting his vote to dismiss on
the ground that the Court had refused to rehear Colegrove v.
Green and to hear Cook v. Fortson (Turman v. Duckworth).
Mr. Justice Brennan withheld discussion of the Barrett case
until last in disposing of the per curiam decisions, and brushed
it off with the following observation: "Lastly, Colegrove v. Barrett
... , in which Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred in this Court's
refusal to note the appeal from a dismissal for want of
equity, is sufficiently explained by his statement in Cook v. Fortson,56 supra: 'The discretionary exercise or non-exercise of equitable or declaratory judgment jurisdiction ... in one case is not
precedent in another case where the facts differ.' "u7 The statement is no doubt true in an abstract sense, though one would suppose that if the difference in fact alluded to relates to one of the
facts on which the first decision turned, it is true of all precedents.
53
54

55
56
57

Daly v. County of Madison, 378 Ill. 357, 38 N.E.2d 160 (1941).
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
No. 46, C 1946, N.D. Ill. (unreported).
329 U.S. 675 (1945).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 236-37.
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In the context of the statement in his Cook (Turman) 58 opinion,
what Mr. Justice Rutledge meant was undoubtedly that since the
actual decision in Colegrove v. Green turned upon questions of
timing and the efficacy of equitable relief in that case-his being
the deciding vote-it was no bar to the consideration of the constitutional questions in Cook (Turman), and further, that Cook
(Turman), unlike Colegrove, did not deal with allocation of
representatives among geographical subdivisions of the state;
rather, it dealt with distribution of influence in the nomination
of officers to be selected at large.
What relevance does the statement have, then, in the effort
to distinguish the Baker case from the Barrett case? In the latter,
the Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the bill by the district court presented no substantial federal question. Since the
district court delivered no opinion, it is not apparent that the
decision was based on the ground that there existed any special
equity considerations such as lack of time to give adequate relief.
The relief requested was substantially the same. On the constitutional level the cases present exactly the same issues and the discrepancies in representation ratios complained about in Barrett
were only slightly smaller than those complained of in Baker.59
In short, if it is conceded that differences in facts can take the
teeth out of earlier decisions, Mr. Justice Brennan failed to point
out any differences in facts between Baker and Barrett which could
be expected to accomplish that result. As a matter of fact, he suggested no differences at all.
At this point it is useful to go back and place the decisions
from Colegrove v. Green through MacDougall v. Green in orderly
sequence to see if it is possible to trace the Court alignment on
the issues involved. As we have seen, in Colegrove v. Green no
questions of constitutional law were finally decided. No questions
of any sort were decided by a majority of the full Court. Soon
after the qualification of Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Mr. J ustice Jackson's return to the Court, an effort was made to reopen
the case so that the issues could receive the attention of the full
Court. In the meanwhile, the appeals in Cook v. Fortson (Turman
v. Duckworth) were filed. The motion for rehearing in Colegrove
v. Green was heard and disposed of by the same seven members
who had sat on that case, the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Jack58
50

Cook v. Fortson (Turman v. Duckworth), 329 U.S. 675 (1946).
See note 24 supra.

722

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

son taking no part. Mr. Justice Rutledge was of the opinion that
the petition for rehearing should be granted and the case set
down for argument with Cook (Turman). He did not consider the
latter obviously moot and apparently thought a consideration of
the three cases together by the full Court would serve to clear up
the fog produced by the various opinions of the "bobtailed" Court
in Colegrove v. Green. 60 His reasons are obscure but hinted at
by his Colegrove opinion. He was of the opinion that the issues
were justiciable, and may have wished to have that issue ruled
upon by the full Court to avoid the effect of the "political question" language in the Frankfurter opinion on subsequent efforts
to raise these issues. If this was his motive, subsequent events suggest that perhaps he was correct. In any event it is hard to suggest
other motives in view of his desire to dispose of the case in the
first instance on the ground that the time factor made relief of
doubtful efficacy, and his statement that wherever possible the
substantive constitutional question should be avoided. It had been
avoided in Colegrove v. Green, and the mootness of Cook (Turman) was certainly plausible enough to provide as sensible an
"out" as the time considerations were in Colegrove.
The views of the three Colegrove dissenters are also of interest. Since Mr. Justice Rutledge favored rehearing, and the petition for rehearing was heard by only seven members of the Court,
it was within their power to reopen the case. They did not, and
the two motions for rehearing were denied. 61 In Colegrove v.
Barrett, Mr. Justice Rutledge said that he concurred in the dismissal in view of the fact that the Colegrove petition for rehearing
had been denied and the appeals in Cook (Turman) had been
dismissed. 62 Viewed from the time of occurrence, it might be
thought that the four who failed to join the Frankfurter opinion
in Colegrove v. Green had given up, and the matter was settled.
From their opinions in MacDougall, however, it seems probable
that the members of the original Colegrove Court remained unchanged in their positions and that the three dissenters were engaged in what may be called tactics of dissent. They must have
assumed that their views would not find acceptance among a majority and were therefore reluctant to risk the possibility that a
full-scale hearing of the issues, followed by an opinion on the
60 The term "bobtailed" is borrowed from the Clark opinion in Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. at 252.
61 329 U.S. 825 (1946); id. at 828.
62 329 U.S. 675 (1946).
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merits, would give majority support to the views expressed by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his Colegrove opinion. In MacDougall,
of course, this is exactly what happened. Mr. Justice Rutledge
won his point, however, on the issue of justiciability. The Court
heard the cause on the merits, and, citing Colegrove and Barrett,
reached a decision adverse to the views of Justices Black, Douglas,
and Murphy. The decision in MacDougall is important, then,
not only because it decided the constitutional issues as posed by
the facts before the Court in that case, but because presumably it
casts some light upon the views of the majority of the full Court
on the meaning of the dismissal of the appeal in Barrett as presenting no substantial federal question, and follows the view of
the adherents to the Frankfurter opinion in Colegrove that the
equal protection clause does not require that political influence
be apportioned among the state's geographical subdivisions on a
per capita basis, without regard to density of population. In
summary, the dissenters had lost on their assertion of a constitutional requirement of "one man-one vote." They had won on their
view that the issue should be heard on the merits. One might ask
why Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined in deciding the merits, but it
will be remembered that he also would have decided the merits
in Colegrove.
At this point Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge
left the Court and were replaced by Justices Clark and Minton,
an event which could not adversely affect the majority but might
serve to increase its margin. That term brought the appeals in
South v. Peters63 and in Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors. 64 South
v. Peters was a suit in equity brought in the Federal District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia seeking to restrain the operation of the Georgia primary law in the primary election which
was to be held in 1950 to nominate Democratic candidates for the
general election to be held later in the same year. Under the
Georgia act in question a number of unit votes was assigned to
each county in the State, ranging from six in the eight most populous counties down to two for some of the smaller counties. In each
county the votes were counted and the person receiving the majority was credited with all of the unit votes in that county. The case
was similar to the apportionment cases because it was alleged that
the assignment of six unit votes to Fulton County, with its 473,572
63

64

339 U.S. 276 (1950).
339 U.S. 940 (1950).
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inhabitants, and two to Chattahoochee, with fewer than 2,000, 05
was a violation of the equal protection clause in that it amounted
to a debasement of the votes of the residents of Fulton County,
it being said that a vote in Fulton County was worth I/ 122 of a
vote in Chattahoochee66 in terms of the influence it had on the
outcome of the election. The Georgia statute had other evils.
From the viewpoint of the individual voter, not only might his
vote be counted as I/ 122 of his counterpart in another county,
but it might be counted for the person he voted against. Similar
to the electoral college system, the Georgia unit vote method left
the possibility that a candidate might be nominated when he had
received less than a plurality of the votes cast at the primary election.
In a per curiam opinion a divided district court held that the
system did not violate the Constitution. 67 It read the dismissal of
the bill in Wood v. Broom, over contentions made under the
equal protection clause, as having the effect of denying relief under
the fourteenth amendment, despite the fact that the point was not
specifically discussed in the majority opinion. It read the minority
opinion in Wood as "put on the ground that the matter was political and not of equitable cognizance." The subsequent cases, said
the court, followed Wood; they did not overrule it.
Judge Andrews dissented.68 He saw the issue in South as one
of whether one man's vote should be counted more than another's.
He read the Colegrove case as depending upon difficulties in fashioning relief and not standing upon the broader ground of absence of jurisdiction to correct a political wrong. He took the
Allwright69 case as settling the question of whether the right to
vote in a primary election which is an integral part of the state's
election machinery is within the constitutional protection against
discriminations in matters of the franchise, and Chapman v. King10
as holding that the Georgia primary elections were an integral
part of the election machinery. South, he said, was different from
Colegrove because it required no future legislation and presented
no problems in fashioning methods of relief. It was further disSee South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 278 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Mr. Justice Douglas speaks of the difference as "over 120." The figure 122 to 1
comes from Judge Andrews' dissenting opinion in the district court. See 89 F. Supp. 672,
683 (N.D. Ga. 1950). Judge Andrews speaks of the average difference as 11 to 1.
67 South v. Peters, 89 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Ga. 1950).
68 Id. at 681.
69 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
70 154 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1946).
65
66
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tinguished by the fact that in South the plaintiffs did not complain of their county's lack of representation in the General Assembly. They simply asserted a constitutionally protected right to
vote for their nominee for United States Senator, and to have their
votes counted like all other votes.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court with this comment: "Federal courts consistently refuse to exercise their equity
powers in cases posing political issues arising from a state's geographical distribution of electoral strength among its political subdivisions. See MacDougall v. Green ... ; Colegrove v. Green ... ;
Wood v. Broom ... ; cf. Johnson v. Stevenson ...." 11
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Black, wrote a dissenting opinion. He relied upon Colegrove v. Green and MacDougall v. Green, without mentioning the Wood case. The first,
he said, depended upon Mr. Justice Rutledge's vote, and was
decided upon special facts of time and the uncertainty about the
effectiveness of the relief sought. Those factors, he demonstrated,
were not present in South. Over two months remained before
the scheduled primary. MacDougall he apparently interpreted as
resting upon the question of justiciability: "And in MacDougall
v. Green ... , the Court on a closely divided vote refused to interfere with the provisions of the Illinois law governing the formation of a new political party. There is no such force in the argument that the question in the present case is political and not
justiciable."72
Mr. Justice Brennan said that South v. Peters "appears to be a
refusal to exercise equity's powers." 73 Such a refusal is not explainable in terms of the sort of problem which prompted Mr. Justice
Rutledge to put his vote in Colegrove on the ground of want of
equity. The Court described the class of cases in which federal
courts "consistently refuse to exercise their equity powers," 74 and
the class is stated to encompass "cases posing political issues arising
from a state's geographical distribution of electoral stength among
its political subdivisions." 75 For examples of the application of
this principle one is referred to Wood v. Broom, Colegrove v.
Green, and MacDougall v. Green. Wood, if it has any relevance
to the constitutional question, must have decided it on the merits,
71
72
73
74
7ti

South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950). (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 280.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 235.
South v. Peters, 339 U.S. at 277.
Ibid.
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for as we have seen the Court refused to dispose of the case on the
ground of want of equity, and refused to say whether or not the
issues would have been justiciable had there been a statutory
requirement of equality of population among districts. Since the
failure to uphold relief granted below in the face of a claim of
entitlement to it under the fourteenth amendment was not explained in the majority opinion in Wood, it is of cou~se not beyond argument that the Court was of the opinion that a claim
under the fourteenth amendment is not justiciable, whereas a
claim under the statute might be, but such a holding would be,
to all intents and purposes, a holding that there is no requirement
of equality under the naked fourteenth amendment, but there is
a power in Congress to provide one. In Colegrove, the deciding
vote was cast on want of equity in the particular bill, but three
of the four Justices voting to affirm placed their votes on the
merits under Wood v. Broom, as well as upon want of equity, the
discussion of the second ground demonstrating, however, that the
want of equity rested upon the opinion that the entire class of
cases was not proper grist for the judicial mill. In MacDougall,
the merits were heard and determined.
Certainly Mr. Justice Brennan was correct in stating that the
South case cannot be looked upon as one in which the Court had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter. The writer suggests that
it is also impossible to consider it as one dismissed because of such
factors as timing or special problems of giving relief. The primary
election in question was two months away and the relief sought
did not require anything but an order to the election officials to
count the votes without debasing them or allocating all votes from
a county to the candidate receiving a plurality within the county.
Whatever the reason for non-intervention, the Court announced
adherence to such a policy in equity cases involving "political"
issues arising out of geographical allocation of electoral strength.
Just why the language of the short statement handed down in the
South case returned to that of abstention from adjudicating "political" issues76 rather than the plain language of absence of constitutional requirement employed in MacDougall 77 is not apparent.
The language seems to be a return to the Frankfurter position in
Colegrove, that these political controversies are things that equity
courts are well out of, whether or not they might be of the opinion
76
77

See text at notes 74-75 supra.
See text at note 40 supra.
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that there is alleged some evil which might abstractly be considered
violative of the principles of equality suggested by the general provisions of the Constitution. The references to the previous cases
indicate that the Court is not modifying these decisions, but may
suggest that it is less willing to say that the Georgia legislature
had achieved a "proper distribution" of political initiative than
it was in speaking of the Illinois statute. On its facts, then, South
is a much stronger case than MacDougall, but it does employ the
language of discretion, rather than the language of power, or of
constitutional substance.
The appeal in Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors78 was decided
a week after the Court ~elivered its opinion in South. Tedesco
was a case in which plaintiffs contested the validity of the new
charter of the city of New Orleans. Under the old charter the city
was governed under a so-called commission plan. A mayor and
four commission councilmen were elected at large. After their
election and qualification the subject-matter functions of the city
government were parcelled out among the councilmen, each becoming administrative head of one of the city's departments. The
new charter added three members to the commission council and
provided that the seven commission councilmen should be elected
from districts, retaining the at-large election of the mayor. The
election districts named were the so-called "municipal districts"
of the city, which varied in population from 8,508 to 48,020. The
complaint charged that the new charter was unconstitutional in
that it subjected the plaintiff to government by persons for whom
he was not permitted to vote, and in that residents of the less populous districts were given greater representation in the commission
council than those who resided in those more heavily populated.
Since the claim was joined with a variety of allegations of unconstitutionality under the Louisiana constitution, the bill was
brought in the state courts. The Court of Appeal for the Parish
of New Orleans disposed of the state claims and then, after a
review of the United States Supreme Court cases, held that the
charter did not violate the fourteenth amendment. Expressing
some doubt that discrimination of any sort other than violation
of the fifteenth or nineteenth amendments was prohibited under
the Constitution, it said that, in any event to show constitutionally
prohibited discrimination without demonstrating violation of the
fifteenth or nineteenth amendment, it would be necessary to show
78

839 U.S. 940 (1950).
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that the plan under attack did not admit of benign construction.
It added that possible benign legislative motives had been suggested and therefore in the case at bar no "unwarranted" and hence
unconstitutional discrimination had been shown. 79
The appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed for want of
a substantial federal question. 80 The Court was unanimous; there
was no written opinion, and no cases were cited. Mr. Justice Brennan interpreted Tedesco as holding "solely that no substantial federal question was raised by a state court's refusal to upset the districting of city council seats, especially as it was urged that there
was a rational justification for the challenged districting." 81
What Mr. Justice Brennan meant by this is rather obscure.
Does Tedesco depend upon the fact that it is an appeal from a
state court's decision? There is no hint in the lower court opinion
of any independent state ground for the decision. The federal
constitutional issue was squarely faced and decided. The allegation was that a citizen living in one district of 8,508 was represented by one commission councilman and his fellow citizen in
another district containing over five times as many inhabitants
was also represented by one member, a difference in representation
ratio of over five to one. The court's answer was: "We conclude
that there is nothing in the statute violative of ... any of the provisions of the Federal Constitution nor the amendments thereof." 82
Nor was there any suggestion in Tedesco that the state court was
either unable or unwilling to grant the relief asked, had it been
of the opinion that the new charter violated the provisions of the
Constitution. Indeed, the court stated that, following the lead of
the Supreme Court of Louisiana, it would "pretermit" the "various pleas and exceptions," and pass directly to the merits because
it was desirable that the issues be promptly and finally settled, so
that the city could commence operations under its new charter. 83
Can it be that a decision on the merits disposing of a claim under
the United States Constitution, in a case in which the state court
dispenses with formalities and decides the merits because it wants
an early and final determination, presents no substantial federal
question, independent of the merits of the particular claim? The
79 Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for Parish of Orleans, 43 So. 2d 514,
518 (La. Ct. App. 1949).
so Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950).
81 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 235.
82 43 So. 2d 514, 519 (La. Ct. App. 1949).
83 Id. at 516. See City of New Orleans v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for Parish
of Orleans, 216 La. 115, 43 So. 2d 237 (1949).
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writer suggests that the case cannot turn upon the fact that the
case was originally decided by a state tribunal. Relations between
federal and state courts may require the federal courts to refrain
as much as possible from ordering state courts to provide remedies
they do not choose to provide; it certainly does not require that
the Supreme Court leave the state without a solution as to constitutional issues until someone brings another suit in a federal
court.
Nor does the fact that Tedesco involves the representation of
citizens on a local council commission serve to distinguish the
case. If a citizen has a right to equal representation in the state
legislature, can it be that he has no similar right to representation
in the legislature of the local jurisdiction in which he lives? The
writer should have thought that this question was decided in the
negative in 1915, in Myers v. Anderson. 84 There the defendant
argued that the fifteenth amendment did not apply to municipal
elections, but he lost. Can it be that the fourteenth amendment is
any less universal in its application to the various levels of state
and local government?
In regard to the rational justification of the challenged districting, it should be mentioned initially that prior to the enactment of
the new charter amendments in 1948, the members of the commission council were all elected at large. Two arguments were
made against the change to district elections. The first was to the
effect that mere election from districts made the amendment unconstitutional. The state court made short shrift of this, pointing
out that the members of many of the state's institutions of government were selected from districts, including the members of the
state supreme court. The other argument was inequality in the
population of the districts. To this the court had said that not
difference but "unwarranted" discrimination would have to appear. It went on to say that such unwarranted discrimination, if
shown, would invalidate the statute. It then inquired into the
"real reason" for the passage of the legislation. Whatever that
may have been, said the court, "whether the reason was political,
or whether it was punitive, we must assume that the legislature
acted properly and on sound reason." 85
Continuing, the state court made the following statement,
84 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
81:i

Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for Parish of Orleans, 43 So. 2d 514,

518 (La. Ct. App. 1949).
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resulting in Mr. Justice Brennan's qualification dealing with "rational justification for the challenged districting."
"Counsel for defendants call attention to the fact that at the
present time no one of the Commissioners was chosen from
the downtown or lower districts of the City, and they call
attention to the further fact that there are divergent groups,
social and otherwise, who live in the various districts and
counsel suggest that possibly a realization of the fact that
some of these downtown groups are not represented on the
present Commission Council led the Legislature to decide that
some method should be adopted under which each of the various districts, however located, would be represented. We do
not know that this was the reason, but it is a possible reason,
and who can say that it is not a sound reason. If it was, then
there was no unfair discrimination." 86
This is plainly nothing more than an example of the time-honored
statement that courts will presume that the legislature has done
its duty and leave to the plaintiffs the task of demonstrating otherwise. Since "certain groups, social and othenvise" are everywhere
present in unlimited variations, the possible rational base for the
discrepancies "urged" upon the Court in Tedesco is present in
all apportionment schemes. If its urging in Tedesco distinguishes
that case from the rest, it is a triumph of ritual over substance.
Before further changes in the personnel of the Court, three
more apportionment cases were decided. The first of these was
Remmey v. Smith. 87 Remmey was a suit in a federal district court
to challenge the Pennsylvania Apportionment Act of 1921, as
applied in 1951, and to compel the legislature to reapportion the
state in a constitutional manner. The district court dismissed the
bill. The majority, in an opinion by Judge Biggs, said that even
where the apportionment in the selection of national representatives was involved, the Supreme Court had held that the issues
were "of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for
judicial determination." 88 He went on to say that, a fortiori, a
court of the United States should not compel a state to apportion
with respect to its own legislature. In a footnote he stated his
opinion that the question of jurisdiction was not a settled one.89
In any event he thought that while the legislature was still in ses86
87
88
89

Id. at 519.
342 U.S. 916 (1952).
Remmey v. Smith, 102 F. Supp. 708, 710 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
Id. at 710 n.11.
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sion, and the 1950 census only a year old, the suit was prematurely
brought, and for that reason he would dismiss it for want of equity.
Judge Bard concurred, but went to the merits. 90 Relying upon
Minor v. Happersett, 91 he took the discriminations prohibited by
law to be only those based upon race, color, previous condition
of servitude, and sex. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
for want of a substantial federal question. It cited no cases. Mr.
Justice Brennan limited the authority of the case to the ground
given by the district court, the fact that the case was prematurely
brought.
The second case was Cox v. Peters. 92 Cox was an appeal from
the Supreme Court of Georgia, which court had again upheld
the county unit primary system under attack in South v. Peters. 93
The Georgia court had held that the right to vote in a primary
election was not within the protection of the equal protection
clause unless, under the rule of Classic,94 Allwright95 and Herndon, 96 the primary is an integral part of the election machinery
of the state. In Chapman v. King the Georgia primary had been
held to be an integral part of the election machinery of the state,
but the court took that case to be no longer applicable because of
subsequent changes in the Georgia constitution. The Georgia
law did not require the holding of a primary but specified how
it must be held if the party decided to hold one. This fact, the
court said, distinguished it from Classic, Allwright, and Herndon.
On appeal, the appellees recognized the thinness of this holding and did not rely upon it alone. 97 They stated that they were
not contending that the fifteenth amendment does not confer upon
Negro citizens of Georgia the right to vote in the primaries, and
rested their case on Minor v. Happersett and on the apportionment decisions. The appellants were anxious to frame the issue
as one of whether primaries involve "state action" where they are
regulated as to method but not required-with some warrant one
would suppose, in view of the fact that the holding below was
constitutionally feeble. They argued that since the Georgia court
oo Id. at 711.
01 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
92 342 U.S. 936 (1952).
93 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
94 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
Oli Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
06 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
07 See Statement Opposing Jurisdiction and Motion To Dismiss or Affirm, p. 4, Cox
v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952).
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had decided upon that ground and had not considered the question of asserted right to equal influence, the Court should grant
a summary reversal. Instead, it dismissed the appeal for want of
a substantial federal question. When the decision came down, and
the appellants noticed that no opinion had been written and no
cases cited, they filed a motion for rehearing, praying that the
Court at least give a statement of reasons because the decision
might be taken as holding the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments do not apply to Georgia primaries at all. In aid of this
motion the United States, through its Solicitor General, filed a
memorandum in which the Solicitor General interpreted the
Court's dismissal of the appeal not as approving the ground stated
by the Georgia Supreme Court, that holding being clearly inconsistent with Classic, Allwright, and Herndon, but as following
the apportionment cases. 98 On the authority of Doremus v. Board
of Education, 99 he argued that since the apportionment cases rested
on absence of jurisdiction in the federal courts, there might still
be jurisdiction in the state courts to adjudicate the issues. This
motion was denied without comment or the citation of authority.
Mr. Justice Brennan had this to say about the case: "And Cox v.
Peters . .. dismissed for want of a substantial federal question the
appeal from the state court's holding that their primary elections
implicated no 'state action.' " 100 This is a factually accurate statement, of course, but the implication that Cox was dismissed because of the Court's views on the line to be drawn in defining
"state action" in primaries is in this writer's opinion absurd. In
98 See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Petition for Rehearing, p. 6, Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952): "We do not construe
the Court's dismissal of the appeal as implicitly approving this ground of the State
court's decision . . • . It would appear, however, that the dismissal of the appeal rests
upon an application of the rule applied in South v. Peters, supra, as to the nonjusticiable character, so far as federal courts are concerned, of the political questions involved in
the suit. Ordinarily, of course, the Court limits its review solely to a consideration of the
precise federal question decided by the state court ..•• And where a state court decision is
based on an erroneous federal ground, its judgment will be vacated and the cause remanded,
notwithstanding that the state court might have based its decision on another ground, not
considered and decided by it, which would have been adequate to support the
judgment ...•
"In this case, however, presumably because a similar controversy had been here two
terms ago in South v. Peters, supra, the Court apparently pretermitted the immediate
question decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia and went directly to what it deemed
the ultimate issue in the case, namely, the merits of the claim of violation of federal
constitutional rights."
99 Id. at 3. See Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
100 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 235.

1963]

LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT

733

the light of Classic,1°1 Allwright,1°2 and Herndon, 103 and with the
hindsight of Terry v. A dams, 104 it is literally inconceivable that
the Court should have thought that the Georgia court's holding
on "state action" was correct. Undoubtedly the Solicitor General's
interpretation of the dismissal was proper, that is, that where the
overturning of the state court ruling would leave the case one of
bald allegation of geographical differences in representation ratio,
in no respect different from the allegations made in South v.
Peters, the Court would not trouble itself to correct the state court
on the ground of its decision where the result was clearly consistent with the Supreme Court precedents.105 Certainly the bar
did not take Cox to hold what Mr. Justice Brennan implies that it
held, since it was not so much as referred to in the briefs in Terry
v. Adams,1°6 nor was it mentioned in any of the four opinions in
that case, though if it was a precedent in the "state action" line
of cases, it was obviously in want of distinguishing, for certainly
the Georgia law governing primaries was much less private in its
operation than was the Jaybird Association. Is it conceivable that
had Cox been a plausible claimant under the fifteenth amendment, his claim would have raised no substantial federal question?
And certainly if a right to equal geographical representation exists
under the fourteenth, there is no way to distinguish the effect of
such a holding, for "state action" is required to invoke both the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.
If one assumes that Cox does not turn on this point, but on
the law as announced in earlier apportionment cases, what does
it add to the growth of the doctrine of judicial non-intervention?
In the first place, it was an action at law for money damages, not
a suit in equity. It could not then be resolved on a doctrine of discretionary power to refrain from exercising equity jurisdiction. If
the non-intervention rule rested on article III,1°7 as was suggested
by the Solicitor General, it could be explained as taking the matter away from all federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
but such an interpretation runs squarely into the holdings in
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
103 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
104 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
105 See note 98 supra.
100 See Petition for Certiorari, Brief for Petitioners, Brief for Respondents, and
Petition for Rehearing, Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
107 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
101

102
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MacDougall v. Green108 and South v. Peters,1° 0 where the language
of the Court's opinions precludes an inference that the matter
presents no case or controversy under the provisions of article III.
The only basis of the decision consistent with all prior precedents
is the ground that the unit system, already upheld on the merits
by the federal district court in South v. Peters, in a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court, did not deprive the residents of
the more populous counties of any right under the equal protection clause.
It is true that the method employed by Mr. Justice Brennan
in disposing of the case cost nothing, for though it was left to
depend upon a holding which was erroneous, and completely
inconsistent with the Court's prior decisions, the question of
"state action" in holding primaries was settled by the Terry1 10
case, leaving Cox taken care of without risking future embarrassment to the Court. This is not so clear in Anderson v. ]ordan, 111
the third of the cases before the Court during this period. Anderson also arose in a state court. It was an action invoking the California Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in mandamus to
force the legislature of that state to reapportion. The writ was
denied per curiam, without opinion.112 The Chief Justice of
California issued a certificate to the effect that the constitutional
issue had been heard and decided. In the United States Supreme
Court the appeal was dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question.113 There was no opinion, but a reference to the same
three cases referred to in South v. Peters: 114 MacDougall v. Green,m
Colegrove v. Green,116 and Wood v. Broom. 117 Mr. Justice Black
and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented.U 8 In Anderson v. ]ordan119 it
was argued by the Attorney General of California that the certificate did not indicate that the federal issue was necessary to the
decision, and Mr. Justice Brennan seized upon that to distinguish
335 U.S. 281 (1948).
339 U.S. 276 (1950).
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
111 343 U.S. 912 (1952).
112 The decision of the Supreme Court of California is unreported. See Statement
as to Jurisdiction, Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952).
113 Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952).
114 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
115 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
116 328 U .s. 549 (1946).
117 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
118 South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276,277 (1950).
119 343 U.S. 912 (1952).
10s
100
110
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Anderson from Baker. "[In Anderson v. Jordan] it was certain
only that the State court had refused to issue a discretionary writ,
original mandamus in the Supreme Court. That had been denied
without opinion, and of course it was urged here that an adequate
state ground barred this Court's review." 120 Again the statement
is factually accurate. If this was the ground on which the appeal
was dismissed, however, how can the references be explained? All
three of these cases came to the Supreme Court on appeal from
lower federal courts and could not conceivably have had anything to
do with independent state grounds. Further, during the same
term of Court, action on Dixon v. Duffy 121 was postponed for
a second time to await more formal determination of the ground
upon which the California Supreme Court had decided another
original jurisdiction case, one involving habeas corpus. Certainly
had the case turned upon the California Attorney General's contention that the chief justice's certificate was insufficient to show
the necessity of the decision on the merits of the constitutional
issue, some reference to the certificate dispute would have been
included in the references. Instead, the Court dismissed the
case with: "See MacDougall v. Green ... , Colegrove v. Green
... , Wood v. Broom . . . . " Dixon v. Duffy was cited to the
Court by the appellants and it was urged that, if the certificate
were deemed insufficient, appellants be given time to obtain a
more lucid one.122 The next term of Court, with Mr. Justice
Jackson dissenting, the judgment of the California Supreme
Court in Dixon v. Duffy was vacated and the cause remanded
so that the reasons of the California court could be made explicit.123 Could it be that Anderson, contrary to the then current
practice of the Court in doubtful certificate cases, was dismissed
on the ground that there was no adequate showing of a necessarily
decided federal question, with no opportunity being given the
appellants to obtain a more satisfactory certificate, and in a memorandum decision calling attention to MacDougall, Colegrove, and
Wood?
If it is true that Anderson v. Jordan cannot be looked upon as a
case disposed of on the ground of existence of an independent state
ground of decision, what is its significance in the line of appor120 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 235.
121 343 U.S. 393 (1952). See also Dixon v. Duffy, 342 U.S. 33 (1951).
122 See Appellant's Brief Opposing Motion To Dismiss or Affirm,
v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952).
12a Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143 (1952).

p. 6, Anderson
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tionment cases? The Supreme Court could have disposed of it
on the ground that the matters sought to be litigated were outside
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court. As we have seen before, this ground is untenable, and in any event if the Court
thought the matter outside its jurisdiction it would hardly call
attention to MacDougall. It could not have disposed of it upon
the ground that as a matter of discretion federal courts will not
exercise their equity powers in such cases, for Anderson was an
appeal from a state court. Unless it depended upon the certificate controversy, then, the only way to explain Anderson is that it
comes within the doctrine of MacDougall v. Green-that the
Constitution does not require equal apportionment of electoral
strength among the territorial subdivisions of the state. In Anderson, there was no reason assigned for the dismissal of the appeal.
It was simply noted that the motion to dismiss was granted and
the appeal dismissed. The motion to dismiss was based upon three
points. The first was independent state ground; the second, want
of jurisdiction; and the third, want of a substantiality of the federal
question because the issue was "political."
Between Anderson v. Jordan and the next of the apportionment cases, a period of four years elapsed during which there
were three changes in the Court's personnel. Mr. Chief Justice
Warren replaced Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, Mr. Justice Harlan
replaced Mr. Justice Jackson, and Mr. Justice Brennan replaced
Mr. Justice Minton. In 1956, the Court had before it two apportionment cases. The first of these was Kidd v. McCanless,12 4 on appeal from a decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court refusing
to invalidate the same Tennessee apportionment act which was
later involved in Baker v. Carr. The state supreme court had held
that it would not declare the act unconstitutional because under
the Tennessee law of de facto officers, there could be no de facto
officer after a judicial declaration that he did not hold his office
de jure.125 Because of this, said the Court, were it to declare the
act unconstitutional there would be no ·de jure legislature and no
de facto legislature, even for the purposes of enacting another apportionment act, and the state would be left in chaos. In the
United States Supreme Court the appeal was dismissed in a per
curiam opinion which read: "The motion to dismiss is granted
and the appeal is dismissed. Colegrove v. Green ... , Anderson
12-1
125

352 U.S. 920 (1956).
See Kidd v. Mccanless, 200 Tenn. 273,292 S.W.2d 40 (1956).
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v. Jordan .
.''126 Mr. Justice Brennan, in his Baker opinion,
stated, "Of course this Court was there precluded by the adequate
state ground, and in dismissing the appeal ... we cited Anderson
... as well as Colegrove." 121 The motion to dismiss was grounded
upon the existence of an independent state ground, the absence of
a substantial federal question on the merits, and the view that
apportionment is a "political question." 128 Of course, the decision
of the Tennessee Supreme Court did rest upon the state law of
remedies, and necessarily had to, since there were alleged, in addition to the violations of the Constitution of the United States,
several patent violations of the constitution of Tennessee, so that
even had the court decided that there were no violations of federal
requirements, to sustain the demurrer it would have had to come
to the conclusion that it was powerless to correct the local abuses.
It seems, then, that the proper disposition of the case would have
been to dismiss the appeal because of want of a federal question,
precisely the reason assigned to the holding by Mr. Justice Brennan. But why were Anderson v. ]ordan129 and Colegrove v.
Green 130 assigned as authority? Colegrove could have no possible
relevance to this issue. Mr. Justice Brennan suggested that the
clue could be found in the fact that "we cited Anderson ... as
well as Colegrove," for Anderson he had previously characterized
as having been decided on the basis of an independent state ground.
But when we follow the good Justice's method of finding clues,
we discover, as we have already seen, that in Anderson we were
referred to MacDougall, Colegrove, and Wood. This may have
been, as Mr. Justice Brennan suggested, an effort to characterize
the case as one dealing with the existence of an independent state
ground. If so, one can only say with Goethe, "Wenn ich die
Meinung eines Andern anhoren soll, so muss sie positiv ausgesprochen werden; Problematisches hab' ich in mir selbst genug." 131
Not only does this backtracking of citations suggested by Mr.
Justice Brennan lead one to suppose that Kidd v. McCanless takes
its place among the apportionment cases which have developed
the so-called Colegrove doctrine, but forward tracking does so as
Kidd v. Mccanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956). (Citations omitted.)
369 U.S. at 236.
Statement in Opposition to Statement of Jurisdiction and Motion To Dismiss,
p. I, Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956).
120 343 U.S. 912 (1952).
130 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
131 "If I am to listen to the opinion of another, then it must be precisely enunciated; I have sufficient difficulties of my own."
120
121
128
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well. At the same term the Court disposed of the appeal in Radford v. Gary.132 Radford arose in a federal district court, not in
the state court system. It was a suit seeking an order in the nature
of mandamus, requiring the Governor of Oklahoma to convene
the legislature of that state, requiring the legislature to reapportion, and, that failing, requiring the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
to do it for them. In an opinion by Judge Murrah, the district court
held that under the Colegrove doctrine the case posed only "state
political issues" with which the federal courts should not interfere, citing South v. Peters, and concluding that the facts of the
case could not be distinguished from those in the Colegrove and
MacDougall cases.133 Before the district court, motion was made
to dismiss the action because the court lacked jurisdiction over
the subject matter, and because the complaint failed to state a
claim against defendants upon which relief could be granted. 134
On appeal, the appellees moved in the following terms: "Appellees
in the above entitled case move to dismiss on the ground that the
questions presented in appellant's 'jurisdictional statement' herein
are so unsubstantial as to not need further argument" and called
to the Court's attention the pleadings, the motion to dismiss below, the majority opinion below, and "the decisions of the state
and federal courts including the decisions of the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma and of this Court cited and followed in said opinion."135 They filed no briefs and made no arguments. They simply
rested. The answer to the motion was filed on February 11, 1957,
and on February 25 the Supreme Court handed down its decision,
affirming the district court and citing Kidd v. McCanless and
Colegrove v. Green.
So Kidd v. McCanless, which Mr. Justice Brennan suggested
should be recognized as having been dismissed because of the
existence of an independent state ground, through the citation of
Anderson v. Jordan in its dismissal, some two months later was
cited as authority for affirming the decision of a federal district
court which dismissed an attack on a state apportionment scheme
flatly on the ground that the Colegrove and MacDougall cases
could not be distinguished. Mr. Justice Brennan said that "problems of relief also controlled in Radford v. Gary ... affirming the
District Court's refusal to mandamus the Governor to call a ses132 352 U.S. 991 (1957).
133 Radford v. Gary, 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956).
134 See Brief for Appellees, Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991
135 Ibid.

(1957).
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sion of the legislature, to mandamus the legislature then to apportion, and if they did not comply, to mandamus the State Supreme
Court to do so." 136 In a sense, no doubt, problems of relief are part
of the substructure of the Colegrove doctrine, whether one considers the doctrine as jurisdictional, as definitive of the periphery
of the protection afforded by the fourteenth amendment, or simply as an example of judicial restraint. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
put it, "courts ought not to enter this political. thicket." 187 If, on
the other hand, Mr. Justice Brennan suggested that problems of
relief take the Radford case out of the general class of cases seeking
to plunge the federal courts into the "political thicket," or that the
district court dismissed because of special difficulties in giving
relief in this particular case under its facts and pleadings, he was
clearly wrong. The district court took the view that Colegrove
and the other cases which proliferated the doctrine of judicial
non-intervention precluded any relief, not that the relief requested
was inappropriate, or in a proper case beyond the power of this
district court.
The next of the apportionment cases was filed during the October 1957 term. By this time Mr. Justice Reed had retired and his
place had been taken by Mr.Justice Whittaker. The case was Hartsfield v. Sloan. 138 In Hartsfield, the plaintiffs sought once again to
overturn the Neill Primary Act in Georgia. The suit was brought in
a federal district court against election officials, seeking to restrain
them from counting primary election ballots according to the
county unit system. In view of the fact that this was exactly the
same dispute which had been before the Supreme Court in Cook
v. Fortson (Turman v. Duckworth), South v. Peters, and Cox v.
Peters, Judge Sloan refused to convene a three-judge court to hear
it again. In an unreported opinion he reviewed the Court's holdings in South, Colegrove v. Green, MacDougall, and Cox. "Upon
a careful review of the authorities dealing with the question of
subdivision of an election territory," he said, "the Court is of the
opinion that the federal question sought to be raised here is unsubstantial for the reason that the previous decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States foreclose the subject and leave
no room for inference that the question sought to be raised can
be the subject of controversy."139 Following the method approved
130
137
138
130

369 U.S. at 236.
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
357 U.S. 916 (1958).
Hartsfield v. Sloan, N.D. Ga. 1958 (unreported).
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in Ex parte Poresky,140 the plaintiffs sought permission to file a
writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court to require Judge Sloan
to convene a three~udge court to hear the controversy. The petition was denied per curiam without opinion. The Chief Justice
and Justices Black, Brennan, and Douglas were of the opinion
that a rule to show cause should issue. The same four Justices were
of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted, and it
was.141
Mr. Justice Brennan said of Hartsfield v. Sloan that, as in
Remmey v. Smith,142 "problems of timing were critical. ... [M]ovants urged the Court to advance consideration of their case, 'inasmuch as the mere lapse of time before this case can be reached
in the normal course of . . . business may defeat the cause, and
inasmuch as the time problem is due to the inherent nature of
the case... .' " 143 In the motion to advance, movants pointed out
that they had brought the suit below as soon as the announcement
had been made that there was to be a primary election at some
date between then and the general election scheduled for November 1958. They had refrained from bringing it prior to that time
because, since Georgia law did not require any primary to be held,
they were afraid that a suit brought before the announcement that
a primary election was to be held would have been subject to
dismissal on the ground that it was prematurely brought. They
pointed out that "despite the delay occasioned by this petition for
mandamus the petitioner can still obtain effective relief if this
Court grants the writ by the end of this term. The Georgia general
election ballots need not be finally prepared until the last days of
October 1958."144 In appraising the likelihood that Mr. Justice
Brennan was correct in his interpretation of the meaning of the
majority decision to decline to compel a hearing in Hartsfield,
it is of interest that, despite this time factor, all of the three
Justices who signed the Brennan opinion in Baker v. Garr voted
to issue a rule to show cause in the Hartsfield case. Of the Court
which heard Baker, only Justices Clark, Harlan, and Frankfurter
were members of the majority in Hartsfield. In the Frankfurter
dissenting opinion in Baker, joined in by Mr. Justice Harlan, the
140 290 U.S. 30 (1933). See also ROBERTSON &: KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME
OouRT OF THE UNITED STATES § 211 (2d ed. Wolfson&: Kurland 1951).
141 Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958).
142 342 U.S. 916 (1952).
143 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 235.
144 See Motion To Advance, p. 2, Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958).
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case is cited as supporting the Colegrove doctrine,145 and in the
Clark opinion the case is not mentioned by name but the opinion
contains the following statement: "Finally, the Georgia countyunit-system cases, such as South v. Peters ... reflect the viewpoint
of MacDougall, i.e., to refrain from intervening where there is
some rational policy behind the State's system." 14 ~
The next, and last, of the pre-Baker apportionment cases was
Matthews v. Handley. 141 It involved an attack on the validity of
the Indiana gross income tax statute on the ground that the act
was adopted by a legislature elected under an unconstitutional
apportionment statute. The form of the case shows the desperation of the franchise reformers. Having lost in equity, mandamus,
and common-law action for damages, they were undoubtedly seeking to present a new wrinkle to the Court, probably not so much
because they thought that their case could be distinguished from
the many cases denying relief, as because they no doubt noted the
facts that the Chief Justice and Justices Black, Brennan, and
Douglas had voted to issue the rule to show cause in Hartsfield,
and that between 1958 and 1961 Mr. Justice Stewart had replaced
Mr. Justice Burton. Mr. Justice Burton's retirement left Mr.
Justice Frankfurter the lone survivor of the original adherents to
the latter's position in Colegrove v. Green. On the other hand,
two of the original dissenters remained unconverted.
The district court dismissed the suit in Matthews, but, while
it was not disposed to hold that the Colegrove doctrine was in any
sense weakened, it provided the Court with a possible excuse for
not strengthening it by holding that in any event the state law
provided an adequate means for testing the validity of the tax
as applied to the plaintiffs, including the constitutionality of the
statute. On appeal, the judgment of the district court was affirmed
in a per curiam decision without opinion and without citation of
authority. Mr. Justice Brennan took the affirmance to mean that
where there is an adequate state procedure for testing the validity
of a state statute, the federal courts will not enjoin its operation.148
B. The Clark Opinion: Texans Shoot from the Hip
Mr. Justice Clark ·agreed with his brother Brennan that the
issues raised in Baker were part of a subject matter over which the
145
140
147
148

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 279 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 253 n.4 (Clark, J., concurring).
361 U.S. 127 (1959).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 236.
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federal courts have jurisdiction, and that they were not non-justiciable "political questions." He also joined the majority in sending the case back for a decision on the merits. Left to himself to
decide the case, he would have gone further and held for the plaintiffs on the merits. He was of the opinion that the majority in substance had done so, and he preferred to be straightforward about
it. Where, as in Baker, judgments granting motions to dismiss are
reversed on appeal, the normal procedure is to remand for trial so
that the defendant can present any evidence he has, but, in cases
in which the facts are not in dispute, there is precedent for final
disposition of the cause by the appellate court.149 In the Baker
case the facts were not in dispute. The case was not one of urgency, however. Tennesseeans had waited half a century for reapportionment and they could not be said to be mightily inconvenienced by the majority's insistence that defendants get an
opportunity to present evidence before judgment is entered against
them.
If Mr. Justice Clark's objection was to the majority's pretenses
that it was not deciding the merits of the constitutional claim under the facts as admitted in the motion to dismiss, he was on sound
ground. The case came up on admitted facts and the normal manner of deciding it would have been to rule one way or another on
the question of whether the pleadings stated a claim on which relief could be granted.150 The majority disposition of the case left
it undecided whether a claim was stated, and remanded, presumably for a formal determination on that issue. Why such a remand
was necessary or desirable escapes the ·writer completely. All it
could accomplish would be to add to the Court's fund of lower
court opinions on the merits of an argument already before it
fifteen times. It is possible, but improbable, that an opinion from
one more three-judge court would add any new insight.
Since he would have decided the merits, it was necessary for
Mr. Justice Clark to distinguish the cases which Mr. Justice Brennan had disposed of in his opinion. Since with some differences in
language most of them were given the same treatment, it is unnecessary to go down the list, but the differences are worthy of
mention. Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors1 51 and Colegrove v.
Green152 were put aside because in those cases, said Mr. Justice
149
150
151
152

See 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE CJ 41..13(2) (2d ed. 1951).
5 id. CJ 41.13(1). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 4l(b).
339 U.S. 940 (1950).
328 U .s. 549 (1946).
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Clark, the appellants did not argue the equal protection clause.153
In the case of Tedesco, this may have been technically correct. At
least the appellants did not mention that clause by that name.
The claim was made under the due process clause and under the
fourteenth amendment in general, so to speak. But the appellants'
claim that the fourteenth amendment prohibited unequal apportionment of the city was spoken of by the appellees as an equal
protection claim,154 and the appellants insisted in their summary
of points that they were relying upon all of the first section of the
fourteenth amendment. 155 If it can be said that the appellants did
not argue the equal protection clause, the truth of the assertion
depends upon their failure to refer to the subject clause by its
popular name.
As applied to Colegrove v. Green, such a statement is palpably
incorrect. In the complaint, assignments of error, the appellants'
brief, and the amicus brief filed by the Better Government Association, reliance upon the equal protection clause fairly leaps at
the reader. 156 It is true that in the Frankfurter opinion the clause
was not mentioned by name, the constitutional claims being
lumped together as made under "various provisions of the United
States Constitution." 157 But in Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion the equal protection claim was recited. Indeed, Mr. Justice
Black's disagreement with the ultimate disposition of the case
depended upon his belief that appellants had demonstrated a
denial of equal protection of the laws. 158
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 252 (Clark, J., concurring).
See Statement Opposing Jurisdiction and Motion To Dismiss or Affirm, p. 2,
Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950): "He also would predicate a denial
of equal protection of the laws on the circumstance that there is a disparity of electors
in the electoral districts."
155 See Brief for Appellant Opposing Motion of Appellees To Dismiss or Affirm, p. 4,
Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950): "That appellant relies not only
upon the first clause of the second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but upon the entire section."
156 Sec Transcript of Record, Assignment of Errors, Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549 (1946): "The District Court erred in failing to hold that the ••• Act violates the
rights of the plaintiffs under the 'privileges and immunities' clause, the 'due process'
clause and the 'equal protection of the laws' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States." See Brief and Arguments for Appellants, p. 62,
under heading: "The Illinois • • • Act Also Particularly Denies to the Appellants the
Equal Protection of the Laws in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." See also
Brief for the Better Government Association as Amicus Curiae, p. 36: "The Illinois
Redistricting Act of 1901 which defendants seek to enforce creates such gross inequalities
in the Congressional districts as to deny to plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment."
11.i7 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,550 (1946).
158 Id. at 568: "The complaint attacked the 1901 Apportionment Act as unconstitutional and alleged facts indicating that the Act denied appellants the full right to vote
and the equal protection of the laws."
153
154
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Mr. Justice Clark's mistake in this connection may be explained by his adherence to the view of Wood v. Broom160 espoused
by the signers of the Brennan opinion. In putting aside the Frankfurter language on "political questions" as no more than an alternative ground, he appended a footnote in which he said: "The
opinion stated ... that the Court 'could also dispose of this case
on the authority of Wood v. Broom . .. .' Wood v. Broom involved
only the interpretation of a congressional reapportionment Act." 160
The reasoning seems to run from the assumption that Wood was
a case not involving constitutional issues to the conclusion that
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's willingness to dispose of Colegrove v.
Green on the authority of Wood demonstrates that Colegrove, too,
involved no constitutional claim. There are two difficulties with
this line of reasoning. First, in each case the claim rested both
under the statute and under the equal protection clause. It is all
very well to say that a policy against decision of constitutional
issues unadorned by discussion leads the Court to treat as
open the questions which have been disposed of in this way. It
does not follow that the case did not involve a constitutional issue.
Where in a second case the judge deems himself bound by the
first, there are two possible inferences. The first is that the case
did not involve a constitutional claim; the second, that the court
in the second case took the first case to foreclose the constitutional
as well as the statutory issue.161 Clearly the district court read the
Wood case as ruling out both the statutory and constitutional
claims in Colegrove v. Green, for it said: "In the absence of this
decision we would assume that such a requirement [of substantial
equality of population in congressional districts] arose necessarily
from the Constitution."162 When Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in
Colegrove that "the District Court was clearly right in deeming
itself bound by Wood v. Broom, ... and we could also dispose
of this case on the authority of Wood v. Broom," 163 the statement
was to be read against the statement by the lower court that it took
Wood as precluding judicial vindication of a right the court would
See text supra at 715.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 252 n.l.
The latter was clearly the way Wood v. Broom was read by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Daly v. County of Madison, 378 Ill. 357, 364, 38 N.E.2d 160, 164 (1941):
"That there is nothing in the fourteenth amendment which would render invalid congressional districts created by State legislation, on the ground that they are unequal in
population, was settled by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Wood v. Broom .•.."
162 64 F. Supp. 632,634 (N.D. Ill. 1946).
163 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,551 (1946).
159
160
161
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have thought was constitutionally protected. Second, regardless
of the inferences which might othenv-ise be drawn from the willingness of Mr. Justice Frankfurter to dispose of the Colegrove case
on the authority of Wood v. Broom, we know as a fact that in
Colegrove the claim under the equal protection clause was urged
upon the Court, and that the question of whether these claims
were foreclosed by Wood v. Broom was argued by counsel.1 64
The peculiar feature of this slip on the part of Mr. Justice
Clark was the fact that the absence of an equal protection claim
in Colegrove v. Green was wholly unnecessary to his willingness
to set this case aside. He had already pointed out that the Frankfurter view was not the prevailing one. Having hit his target the
first time, he merely weakened his total argument by loosing this
second hail of hip shots.
Though willing to go further than his brethren in the disposition of the Baker case itself, the ground on which Mr. Justice
Clark would have put the result is a narrow one. He said that he
relied on MacDougall v. Green. 165 That disposed of the arguments
on jurisdiction and justiciability. But it is wholly inconsistent
with the theory that the equal protection clause prohibits a state
from apportioning political influence among its geographic subdivisions with an eye to density as well as number of inhabitants.
And Mr. Justice Clark did not question this principle. But the
present Tennessee apportionment struck him as outlandish enough
to be classified as wholly arbitrary, and, as such, in violation of the
Constitution. He noted that not only was there a great difference
between large counties and small counties, but also among large
counties and among small counties. In short, there was no rational
pattern at all. He distinguished South v. Peters, in which he had
joined the majority, as grounded upon the existence of a rational
plan-six units for the largest counties, four for middle-sized
counties, and two for small counties. It will be remembered that
in South the plaintiffs pleaded that the difference in the representation ratio as between the largest county and the smallest was
one to one hundred and twenty-two. 166 In MacDougall it was
stated by the Court that the fifty-three smallest Illinois counties,
with thirteen percent of the population, held an absolute veto
over the creation of new parties by people in the remaining fifty
164 See
549 (1946).
165 335
166 See

Brief and Argument for Appellants, p. 65, Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
See also Brief by Better Government Association, p. 30.
U.S. 281 (1948).
note 66 supra.
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counties, with eighty-seven percent of the population.167 Nor was
the veto mutual. The thirteen percent could fore~ a name on the
ballot with no support among the eighty-seven percent. To Mr.
Justice Clark, then, the line between constitutionality and unconstitutionality is not a mathematical one, but one of reasonable
classification.
In its practical application the Clark view may have special,
if not exclusive relevance to the case, like Baker, in which the
alleged discriminations are the product of passage of time and
shifts in population. In cases of conscious design apparently the
usual presumptions of constitutionality make courts chary of saying that a given pattern has no logic to support it, for, as Judge
Janvier observed in Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, there may be
groups, social and otherwise,168 which the legislature thought
should be represented. Whatever rational base the Court might
think of as a possibility, it knows as a fact that the discrepancies in
representation ratio as between Tennessee counties was not a matter of conscious design at all. It knows this because in 1901 the legislature took as its criterion for distribution the straight population
requirement of the Tennessee constitution and did a middling
fair job of apportionment.
The trouble with this view is that if the legislature may design
a bracket structure which will afford the populous counties no
more representation than they now enjoy, or under the South case
less, the Clark decision in Baker avails them nothing. It would
force elimination of the odd and crazy differences among smaller
counties, but the residents of these counties have made no complaint, and it seems strange to permit residents of Memphis, Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville to raise the question of whether
residents of Washington County are afforded greater representation than those of Unicoi County if their own representation is
within constitutionally permissible ranges. The net effect is to
require that rural bias, to be constitutional, must be advertent,
certainly a reverse twist on the role of intention in equal protection cases.

C. The Douglas Opinion: Substantial Equality
Mr. Justice Douglas, like his brother Clark, would have decided the case on the merits. He would have done so, however,
MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281,283 (1948).
See Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for Parish of Orleans, 43 So.
2d 514, 519 (La. Ct. App. 1949).
167
168
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in the normal way, reversing the district court determination that
the plaintiffs did not state a claim on which relief can be granted
and remanding for a trial of the facts. 169 Since his views on the
merits of the claim have been well knmvn for sixteen years, 170 his
opinion came as no surprise. This time, however, he took occasion to serve notice that his conception of the role of courts in
protecting the people against unfair operation of the political
process does not stop with apportionment of representatives in the
legislature. Conceding that there is a narrow range of political
issues which are beyond judicial competence, he would confine
them to cases in which discretionary duties are vested directly
upon executive officers by the Constitution,171 and cases in which
particular functions have been assigned "wholly and indivisibly"
to another department. 172 He indicated that his views led him to
disagree_ with the decisions in Luther v. Borden113 and Georgia v.
Stanton. 114
On the subject of the issues posed in Baker, Mr. Justice Douglas stated three limitations on the power of the states to apportion
representation. First, the fifteenth amendment prevents discrimination based upon race. Second, the nineteenth amendment prevents discrimination based upon sex. Third, the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits other "invidious
discriminations." This left him with the necessity of showing that
there had been alleged in Baker a discrimination which is "invidious."
"I agree with my Brother Clark that if the allegations in the
complaint can be sustained a case for relief is established.
We are told that a single vote in Moore County, Tennessee,
is worth 19 votes in Hamilton County, that one vote in Stewart or in Chester County is worth nearly eight times a single
vote in Shelby or Knox County. The opportunity to prove
that an 'invidious discrimination' exists should therefore be
given the appellants." 175
369 U.S. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 566 (1946); MacDougall v. Green, 335
U.S. 281, 287 (1948); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950); Anderson v. Jordan, 343
U.S. 912 (1952); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339, 348 (1960).
171 Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860). See also 369 U.S. at 245.
172 See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). See also 369 U.S.
at 246.
173 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849); see 369 U.S. at 242 &: n.2.
174 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867); see 369 U.S. at 246 &: n.3.
175 369 U.S. at 245.
100
170
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This observation leaves unspoken the criteria of invidiousness. In
one breath it seems to say that having shown the order of difference to be nineteen to one and eight to one, a claim has been
made on which relief can be granted. In the next, that the order
of difference entitles the plaintiffs to no more than an opportunity
to submit proof that the discrimination is an invidious one. As
Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his dissent, Baker was not
a case like Gomillion v. Lightfoot,176 in which the geographical
classification was alleged to screen a difference of treatment made
along other and prohibited lines. Since Mr. Justice Douglas conceded that there "is room for weighting,'' 177 the "invidiousness"
here must lie in the order of difference, rather than in the basis of
the classification; unless, perhaps, he was suggesting, as Mr. Justice
Clark did, that the question was one of utter lack of rational pattern. Apparently it was the former. In a footnote it was stated
that "the District Court need not undertake a complete reapportionment. It might possibly achieve the goal of substantial equality
merely by directing respondent to eliminate the egregious injustices."178 This suggests that Mr. Justice Douglas did view the
problem as one of order of difference. Absolute equality is not
required, but substantial equality is.
Taking this view of "invidiousness," it is surprising that Mr.
Justice Douglas did not join his brother Clark in voting to dispose of the case then and there, for certainly the order of the
differences was not in dispute. Within Mr. Justice Clark's formulation, it is conceivable that the defendants could suggest some
possible rational basis or give some explanation which would convince a court that the system was not completely chaotic, for, on
the allegations alone, Mr. Justice Harlan was so convinced. If
substantial equality is required, however, substantial equality
there is not. What the plaintiffs are required to prove that is not
a matter of record, Mr. Justice Douglas left unclear.
Since he has frequently expressed his disagreement with the
Colegrove line of cases, it comes as no surprise that he did not
trouble himself with coining his own methods of disposing of
them. He simply noted that the only impediment to relief in
these cases has been the opinion in Colegrove, "and the cases it
spawned," and that this impediment had been removed by what
the Court had said about them.
176 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
177 369 U.S. at 244-45.
178 Id. at 250 n.5.
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D. The Stewart Opinion
"That is not it at all,
"That isn't what I meant at all."

T. S. Eliot

Mr. Justice Clark suggested that the reader might emerge
from the Court's six opinions suffering from mental blindness. 170
His brother Stewart attempted to avoid this result by simplifying
and interpreting the Court's decision. It holds, said Mr. Justice
Stewart, besides that appellants have standing, two things, and
only two: first, that the issues posed in Baker are within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district courts, and second, that they
do not pose non-justiciable "political questions." 180
He scored Mr. Justice Douglas for suggesting that the Court
was holding that there must be substantial equality of voting
strength as between urban and rural areas, citing MacDougall as
holding to the contrary. He spoke of Mr. Justice Clark's showing
of the irrationality of the Tennessee system and Mr. Justice Harlan's defense of it as not to the point. "The merits of this case
are not before us now," he continued, "the defendants have not
yet had an opportunity to be heard in defense of the State's system
of apportionment; indeed, they have not yet even filed an answer
to the complaint. As in other cases, the proper place for the trial
is in the trial court, not here." 181
This is a round-sounding phrase, but Baker v. Carr came to
the Court on appeal from the judgment of the district court granting a motion to dismiss. Such a motion admits all facts prop€rly
pleaded and contends that, even so, the complaint does not state
a claim on which relief can be granted. Whether those facts can
be proved is of course not before the appellate court. The merits
of the constitutional claim are. 182 It was only by narrowly construing the judgment of the district court that the majority was able to
say with any plausibility at all that the merits were not before
it. 183 The district court construed the Colegrove lines of cases as
holding that, under the facts alleged, no claim had been stated
on which relief could be granted. 184 It was reversed, and its judg170
180
181
182
183
184

369 U.S. at 251 (Clark, J., concurring).
Id. at 265 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 266.
See 5 Mooiu:, op. cit. supra note 149.
See 369 U.S. at 195-98.
See Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. at 826.
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ment vacated. 185 Presumably, however, the merits of the constitutional question could then be raised by another motion to
dismiss, rather than by a trial, or even an answer to the complaint,
so it does not answer Justices Clark and Douglas, and the dissenters, to say the merits were not before the Court because a trial
had not been held. Given the posture of the case, a trial was not
necessary, and the rules provide such procedure for the express
purpose of avoiding unnecessary trials.
E. The Majority: You Can't Tell the Players
Without a Scorecard
It remains to piece together the view of the Court's present
personnel on the central question-the effect of the equal protection clause on the power of the state to distribute representation among its geographical subdivisions.
The one thing that is clear is that the Court was of the opinion
that the question is within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
district court, and is not a non-justiciable "political question." 186
This holding is supported by six members, a comfortable majority,
and unaffected by intervening changes in the make-up of the
Court.
On the merits of the particular claim in the Baker case, the
situation is not quite clear. The Brennan opinion purported not
to decide the issue, but then proceeded to say in a footnote: "Since
we hold that the appellants have-if it develops at trial that the
facts support the allegations-a cognizable federal constitutional
cause of action...." 187 Further, we know the views of Mr. Justice
Black because of his dissenting opinion in Colegrove v. Green and
because he joined the dissent in MacDougall v. Green and in
South v. Peters. It is probable, therefore, that a majority of fiveJustices Black, Brennan, Clark, Douglas, and the Chief Justicewould hold for the appellants on the merits, Mr. Justice Harlan
dissenting and Justices Goldberg, Stewart, and White yet to be
heard from.
On the constitutional requirement of substantial equality of
representation, the position of Mr. Justice Douglas is clear, and,
from previous dissenting opinions, we know that his view is shared
by Mr. Justice Black. On the other hand, the suggestion that rural
bias is unconstitutional as such was expressly rejected by Justices
185
186
187

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
But see text infra at 790.
369 U.S. at 195 n.15.
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Clark and Stewart. Even if the Brennan opinion can be taken as
placing its adherents on the side of Justices Clark and Douglas
on the merits of the particular claim, it gave no hint at all as to
whether the reason lies in the general irrationality of the scheme
(a la Clark), or is grounded in the belief that rural bias is proscribed (a la Douglas). All that can be said is that at least two,
and perhaps four, of the members of the Court share this position,
and that three-] ustices Clark, Harlan, and Stewart-do not. This
leaves the issue in the hands of the newly-appointed Justices Goldberg and White, who could determine a majority either way.
So after thirty years of litigation, twelve years of silence and
50,000 words, the application of the equal protection clause to
problems of apportionment is still in great doubt, in extent if not
in fact.

F. The Frankfurter Opinion: A Parting Thrust
at the New Court 1'.1ilitant
The Colegrove doctrine was not buried without accusation
that it was the victim of foul play. Mr. Justice Clark referred to the
Frankfurter opinion as "go[ing] through so much and conclud[ing]
with so little,"188 a clever piece of persiflage, perhaps, but hardly
apt. The conclusions reached by Mr. Justice Frankfurter were
plain enough. They were three in number. The first had to do
with judicial precedent. Though he spoke of the appellants when
he said, "It would only darken counsel to discuss the relevance and
significance of each of these assertedly distinguishing factors here
and in the context of this entire line of cases," 189 a reader having
gone through what Justices Brennan and Clark had to say about
these cases can scarcely resist the conclusion that their brother
Frankfurter's barb had struck home. For certainly the conclusion
that a bald claim of difference in representation ratio as between
geographical subdivisions is not such a claim as will support equitable relief fairly screams from the apportionment cases decided by
the Court in the past thirty years. The attempts to distinguish
all of them, resting as they do upon tissue-thin distinctions, and
in some cases upon distinctions which are in fact simply not present, are little better than a shell game. Assuming that there is
any such constitutional right, the concession that for thirty years
the Court has refused to enforce it on the divers grounds sug188 369 U.S. at 251.
1so Id. at 280.
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gested by Mr. Justice Brennan is enough to shake the confidence
of the most staunch of the Court's admirers. That the majority
opinion, if it be read from the footnote rather than the text, 190
flies in the teeth of the precedents, is so plain that it is not even
arguable. There have been variations in parlance, to be sure, but
as Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out:
"If the weight and momentum of an unvarying course of
carefully considered decisions are to be respected, appellants'
claims are foreclosed not only by precedents governing the exact facts of the present case but are themselves supported by
authority the more persuasive in that it gives effect to the
Colegrove principle in distinctly varying circumstances in
which state arrangements allocating relative degrees of political influence among geographic groups of voters were challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment." 191

The second conclusion dealt with the application of the "political question" doctrine to the facts of the Baker case. Like the
majority, Mr. Justice Frankfurter had some cases to distinguish,
for it could not be gainsaid that in Smiley v. H olm,192 Koenig v.
Flynn, 193 Carroll v. Becker,194 McPherson v. Blacker, 196 and MacDougall v. Green,1 96 the Court did adjudicate matters dealing with
apportionment, and in the cases dealing with alleged Negro disfranchisement the Court had not hesitated to interfere to protect
a right to equal enfranchisement. In one of them, Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,191 it had gone as far as in effect to change the boundaries
of a city.
Smiley, Koenig, and Carroll were ail distinguished as cases in
which the Court freed the states from supposed limitations under
the Constitution. In such cases, suggested Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
there were no problems "demanding the accommodation of conflicting interests for which no readily accessible judicial standards
could be found." 198 In McPherson v. Blacker, too, though the
Court treated as justiciable the question of whether a state could
190 As, indeed, it undoubtedly can, since the decision in "\\T.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 370
U.S. 190 (1962); see discussion of the Simon case infra at 762-64.
191 369 U.S. at 280 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
102 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
193 285 U.S. 375 (1932).
194 285 U.S. 380 (1932).
195 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
196 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
197 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
198 369 U.S. at 285.

1963]

LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT

753

provide for the election of its presidential electors from districts,
it held that the method of choosing such electors was left in the
absolute discretion of the state. "To read with literalness the abstracted jurisdictional discussion in the McPherson opinion," said
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "reveals the danger of conceptions of
'justiciability' derived from talk and not from the effective decision in a case." 199 The Negro disfranchisement cases were distinguished as resting upon a clear constitutional imperative under
the fifteenth amendment, and "no less" under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth. 200
This ·writer is on record as suggesting that framing the issues
posed in the apportionment cases in terms of what sorts of controversies are "justiciable" and what are not only serves to confuse
them.201 In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, for instance, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said that the violation of the fifteenth amendment
"[lifts] this controversy out of the so-called 'political' arena into
the conventional sphere of constitutional litigation." 202 Conceding
that the problem may be thus described without changing the
outcome, it is suggested that consideration in these terms ultimately requires a determination on the merits of the existence or
non-existence of the constitutional right asserted in the claim. If
so, is it not better to proceed directly to that problem? In the
Gomillion case, would it not have been more precise to say that
in the apportionment cases the plaintiffs asserted a right to equality
of representation by population, a right not vouchsafed to them
by the fourteenth amendment, while in Gomillion it was alleged
that the statute in question infringed the plaintiffs' right not to be
treated differently because of their race, a right which is vouchsafed to them by the fifteenth? As Mr. Justice Harlan said in
his dissenting opinion in Baker, an opinion in which Mr. Justice
Frankfurter joined, one asks the same questions to determine the
existence of the right under the fourteenth amendment that would
be asked in determining the existence of a "political question"
said to be non-justiciable.203
Nor is the language of constitutional substance absent from
any of the Frankfurter opinions. In Gomillion, for example, he
Id. at 285.
Id. at 285-86.
201 See Lucas, Dragon in the Thicket: A Perusal of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 1961
SUPREME COURT REv. 194, 223.
202 364 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1960).
203 369 U.S. at 337 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
100
200
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distinguished the line of cases, such as Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,204 in which the Court had refused to interfere with the
state's free exercise of the power to create political subdivisions
and define their boundaries and powers, by pointing out that in
these cases the infringement complained of was grounded on an
asserted right to equality of taxation and a right to continued
exercise of delegated powers, neither of which is guaranteed under
the Constitution. And in his opinion in Colegrove v. Green, he
began by saying that the case could be disposed of under Wood v.
Broom. In MacDougall v. Green, he joined in an opinion which
held squarely that the fourteenth amendment did not prohibit
allocation of political influence disproportionate to population.
This brings us to the third conclusion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter determined that the claim in the Baker case did not charge
a violation of the equal protection clause. The essence of the
claim, he stated, was the assertion that "the equality which [the
equal protection clause] guarantees comports, if not the assurance
of equal weight to every voter's vote, at least the basic conception
that representation ought to be proportionate to population, a
standard by reference to which the reasonableness of apportionment plans may be judged." To find such a requirement legally
enforceable in "the broad and unspecific guarantee of equal protection is to rewrite the Constitution."205 The trouble with appellants' assertion that the principle of representation proportioned to the geographic spread of population is "the basic
principle of representative government," said Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "is, to put it bluntly, [that it is] not true." 206
Is there a difference, then, between saying that, as a general
proposition matters of politics are not justiciable, but, when the
rights asserted are guaranteed by other provisions of the Constitution, the fact that they are so guaranteed lifts the controversy
out of the "political arena" and "into the conventional sphere of
constitutional litigation," on the one hand, and on the other saying
simply that the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution does
not establish such a right? Both approaches leave the result to
depend upon the existence of the right under the "other provisions of the Constitution." But when we talk about non-justiciability, we pretend not to have considered whether or not the right
207 U.S. 161 (1907).
369 U.S. at 300.
206 Id. at 301.
204
205
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exists, when in fact we have. The different treatment accorded
Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon201 in the Brennan and
Frankfurter opinions illustrates this point. In this case attack
was made on the constitutionality of an Oregon license tax statute
on the ground that it was enacted by initiative act, in violation, it
was alleged, of the "republican form of government" clause, the
due process clause, and the equal protection clause. The Court
held that the matter was not justiciable under the guaranty clause
and that allegations of violation of the fourteenth amendment did
not add anything to the complaint. Mr. Justice Brennan said of
the Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. case that the due process and
equal protection claims were held non-justiciable not because
they were joined with a guaranty clause claim, "but because the
Court believed that they were invoked merely in verbal aid of the
resolution of issues which, in its view, entailed political questions .
. . . We conclude then that the nonjusticiability of claims resting
on the Guaranty Clause which arises from their embodiment of
questions that were thought 'political,' can have no bearing upon
the justiciability of the equal protection claim presented in this
case...." 208 In the Frankfurter opinion, the same case was used
to show that one cannot lift an attack upon the general organization of a state into a justiciable question by attaching an equal
protection label to the claim.209
The reason that the Baker case fell outside the rationale of
Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co., to Mr. Justice Brennan, was that
he had already decided that the claim stated a case of individual
deprivation under the equal protection clause, and that clause was
not invoked merely as a verbal aid to a claim which alleged only
the general unrepublican character of the state's government. To
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, it fell within the case precedent because
there was charged only "that the frame of government is askew" ;210
in short, because there was stated no individual deprivation cognizable under the equal protection clause. The equal protection
claim became, then, merely an effort to pull up a guaranty clause
claim by the bootstraps.
Mr. Justice Harlan suggested that the majority was confused
by the framing of the issues in terms of justiciability, rather than
in terms of what states a cause of action under the equal protec201
208
200
210

22!1 U.S. 118 (1912).
Baker v. Carr, !169 U.S. at 228.
Id. at 290-92.
Id. at 299.
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tion clause.211 The writer suggests that the majority may not be
so much confused as willing to employ confusion inherent in this
manner of speaking as a wedge for introduction of their own
views of the merits the unadorned statement of which would be
even more flatly opposed to the precedents.
G. The Harlan Opinion: A Straightforward Answer
to a Straight/orward Question
In his dissenting opinion, joined in by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
Mr. Justice Harlan said, "once one cuts through the thicket of
discussion devoted to 'jurisdiction,' 'standing,' 'justiciability,' and
'political question,' there emerges a straightforward issue which,
in my view, is determinative of this case. Does the complaint disclose a violation of a federal constitutional right, in other words,
a claim over which a United States District Court would have
jurisdiction. . . ?" 212 He went on to say that he found nothing
in the equal protection clause or elsewhere in the federal constitution which expressly or impliedly supports the view that state
legislatures need be structured so as to reflect approximate equality
of the voice of every voter, and thought the matter settled in MacDougall v. Green213 and reaffirmed in South v. Peters. 214 If no
such requirement can be read from the Constitution, the only
other contention present in the claim is that the Tennessee scheme
of apportionment is so whimsical and arbitrary as to violate the
equal protection clause without reference to a requirement that
apportionment be substantially equal.
Rationality of apportionment schemes, said Mr. Justice Harlan, cannot be determined by the application of arithmetic symbols, there being many factors other than population which might
have influenced the legislature in its allocation of seats. Without
regard to these factors, he was able to see a pattern in the T ennessee system, with what he referred to as "slight disparities between
rural areas."
Legislative inaction Mr. Justice Harlan took to be as surely
an exercise of legislative power as action. 215 In letting the apportionment stay the way it was, the legislative policy was plainly to
retain the rural representation, regardless of shifts in population.
211
212
213
214
215

Id. at 331.
Id. at 330-31 (Harlan,
335 U.S. 281 (1948).
339 U.S. 276 (1950).
369 U.S. at 336.

J.,

dissenting).
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Apparently referring to Mr. Justice Clark, he suggested that at
least some of the majority conceded that rural bias would not of
itself be unconstitutional.216 He did not see that it was more so
by virtue of the fact that the legislature of Tennessee had accomplished it by refusing to reapportion.

II.

SCHOLLE

v. HARE

Scholle v. Hare,211 decided one month after Baker v. Carr,
involved an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of
Michigan dismissing an original action of mandamus brought to
challenge the validity of a 1952 amendment to the Michigan constitution fixing permanent state senate districts.218 It was contended that the amendment, adopted at the general election of
1952 by a margin of 300,000 votes, violated the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, in that it
established an unreasonable and arbitrary distribution of state
senators among senate districts established in the amendment
itself.
Prior to the adoption of the 1952 amendment, the state constitution required senate representation according to population.219 Under its provisions the Michigan legislature had divided
the state into thirty-two senate districts, each electing one senator.
There had not been a reapportionment of the legislature in Michigan since 1925, then relying on the 1920 census. As in Illinois
and in Tennessee, there had been significant shifts in population
since that time, and 1950 found a variation in population between
the largest and smallest districts of 8.9 to 1. The plaintiff lived
in the twelfth district which was the second largest, with 8. 7 times
the population of the smallest. The effect of the 1952 amendment
was to increase the total number of senators elected to thirty-four,
210
211
218

Id. at 340.
369 U.S. 429 (1962).
MICH. CONST. art V, § 2, as amended (1952).
210 MICH. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1908). This provision read: "The Senate shall consist
of thirty-two members. Senators shall be elected for two years and by single districts.
Such districts shall be numbered from one to thirty-two, inclusive, each of which shall
choose one senator. No county shall be divided in the formation of senatorial districts,
unless such county shall be equitably entitled to two or more senators." In § 3 of the
same article, provision was made for districts in the house of representatives, "which
shall contain as nearly as may be an equal number of inhabitants .•••" On the basis
of the language employed, it could be argued that the Michigan constitution did not
require apportionment of senators according to population. The Supreme Court of
Michigan read the last sentence of § 2 as requiring such apportionment. See Williams
v. Secretary of State, 145 Mich. 447, 108 N.W. 749 (1906), under a former provision, and
0Ps. An'Y GEN. MICH. 246, 248 (1923-1924); id. at 81 (1925-1926).
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to remove the constitutional requirement of decennial apportionment, and to make two small changes in the districts as they existed
under the act of 1925. Lapeer and St. Clair counties were separated from the eleventh district (formerly Macomb, Lapeer, and
St. Clair) and made into a separate district (the thirty-fourth), and
Washtenaw County was severed from the twelfth (Oakland and
Washtenaw), and became the thirty-third.
During the period between 1925 and the filing of the action in
Scholle v. Hare, the Michigan legislature had twice reapportioned
the seats in the lower house.220 Under the present apportionment
of the lower house, Oakland County, the county in which the
plaintiff resided, is given six seats of the 110 provided for in the
reapportionment act of 1953. This apportionment presumably
rests on the census of 1950, according to which Oakland had
396,001 inhabitants. On a population basis, Oakland would be
entitled to six and a major fraction representatives. It can be said,
then, that as far as Oakland County goes, it was given roughly
proportional representation in the lower house. The problem in
the Scholle case was therefore different from the one posed in
Baker v. Carr, where the legislature had permitted the representation ratio in both houses to reach a high point in rural bias.
The obvious bargain dravm in Michigan was to freeze the senate
seats on a geographical basis, but retain the popular representation
in the lower house, in effect giving the rural areas a veto on state
legislation. The cases also differ in that in Baker v. Carr the inaction of the legisl~ture was in contravention of the provisions of
the state constitution, while in Scholle v. Hare the scheme was
provided for in the state constitution itself.
By a five-to-three vote, the Supreme Court of Michigan denied
the relief sought. The court was split into several factions. Four
of the eight members thought that there was no infraction of the
equal protection clause. Three thought that there was. The remaining member, Justice Black, was of the opinion that there was
a violation of the equal protection clause, but, under the apportionment cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States,
it was beyond the power of the Michigan Supreme Court to
correct it.
The members of the minority were of the opinion that there
was no occasion to go into whether or not there is a constitutionally protected right to exact representation by population, for, like
220 M1cH. CoMP.

LAws ch. 2, § 3

(Mason

Supp. 1943).
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Mr. Justice Clark later, in regard to the Tennessee apportionment
scheme, they saw complete lack of rational pattern. They distinguished the case of the United States Senate apportionment in the
federal constitution as a representation of pre-existing sovereign
units. In the Michigan system, on the other hand, they took the
districts to be simple creation of arbitrary lines.
The Scholle case was decided on appeal by an eight-man Supreme Court.221 A majority of five members delivered a five-line
per curiam opinion, remanding the case to the Supreme Court of
Michigan for reconsideration in the light of what had been said
by the Court in Baker v. Carr. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. 222 He
argued that four of the Michigan justices, enough to control the
eight-man court, had held that there was no violation of the equal
protection clause in the context of the facts of the case, without
so much as mentioning the problem of jurisdiction or justiciability
of the issues, leaving before the Supreme Court the single issue
of whether or not the Michigan court was right in its decision on
the merits. Justices Clark and Stewart concurred with the majority disposition of the case, but noted that had they agreed with
their brother Harlan that the basis of the Michigan Supreme Court
decision was on the merits, they might well have agreed to decide
the merits without first remanding. In their view, only three of
the five members voting to dismiss placed their decision on absence of the constitutional violation. All but these three, they
believed, "were convinced that, whatever the underlying merits
of the appellant's Equal Protection claim, it was, in the words of
one of the justices, 'not enforcible in the courts.' " 223 The quotation is, of course, from the opinion of Justice Black (of the Michigan Supreme Court), the fifth and doubting member of the
majority.224 Since it was not necessary to have Justice Black's vote
to dispose of the cause, one must believe also that Justice Edwards
read the federal cases to hold absence of jurisdiction or justiciability before one can agree with Justices Clark and Stewart. As
Mr. Justice Harlan suggested, this is quite difficult.
The case was decided by a majority of five, so the votes of
Justices Clark and Stewart were not needed, and the significance
of their concurring opinion lies only in whatever hint it gives of
their views as to the extent of the holding in the Baker case. We
221
222
223
224

Mr. Justice 'Whittaker took no part in the decision.
369 U.S. at 430 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Ibid.
Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W .2d 63 (1960).
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already know the views of Mr. Justice Stewart, for he made them
explicit in his Baker opinion. Mr. Justice Clark, on the other
hand, had said that in Baker, "The majority appears to hold,
at least sub silentio, that an invidious discrimination is present...." 225 Since Mr. Justice Douglas agreed with Clark's view
that a case of invidious discrimination had been made out, there
may have been a clear majority for that position. In joining his
brother Stewart in Scholle, remanding solely on the ground that
the Michigan Supreme Court may have decided that case under
the influence of the non-justiciability doctrine, he seemed to be
willing to go along with the Stewart view of the narrow holding
in Baker.226
The role of Mr. Justice White is of interest, for, as noted
earlier, his views and those of Mr. Justice Goldberg could determine the Court's ultimate decision, even if it is assumed, with
Mr. Justice Stewart, that the merits were not determined in Baker.
He was not on the Court when the Baker case was decided, and
may have thought it better to put off consideration of Scholle until
the next term to avoid a decision by another "bobtailed" Court,
in view of the legacy of dispute left by both Colegrove2 21 and
Baker. On the merits of the Scholle claim, it is interesting to
speculate on the outcome. Under Mr. Justice Douglas's requirement of substantial equality of representation flowing from the
equal protection clause, a good case can be made that the representation of the plaintiff in the Michigan senate is not "substantially equal," the ratio between top and bottom being approximately 6.5 to 1. There remains, however, the fact that plaintiff's
representation in the lower house is approximately equal. The
counties comprising the smallest senate district have a total 1.75
lower house representatives for a population of 61,008, while Oakland has six representatives for a population of 396,001. So there is
still nearly a two-to-one difference in the number of persons represented by one seat. On the other hand, the statewide proportion
is one seat per 57,925 persons, so the Oakland representation in
the lower house is within a fraction of that. As to the lower house,
then, his claim, if any, would have to be that there are other counties which are under-represented, or that substantial equality includes some particular major fraction rule. This leaves the plaintiff's claim as one of under-representation in one house, an issue
225
226
221

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 261.
Id. at 265.
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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not posed in any of the cases, and one on which Mr. Justice Douglas has not had occasion to express himself.
From the fact that they have joined in dissent down through
the years, it may be assumed that Justices Black and Douglas can
be counted together. Mr. Justice Clark, on the other hand, placing
his vote in Baker on the existence of a completely whimsical classification, and distinguishing South v. Peters on the existence of
logical pattern, might find pure whimsy in Michigan, or might
not. The overall plan of giving popular representation in one
house and geographical representation in the other is, of course,
the federal pattern. The view of the dissenters in Scholle v. Hare
that the state case is distinguishable from the federal pattern because of the fact that in the national government representation
was given to existing sovereign units, whereas the definition of
senate districts in Michigan was a mere ipse dixit of the amendment is not exactly borne out by the facts. With the exception of
two changes, these are the districts which have existed for thirtytwo years. Since the term of office under the Michigan constitution is two years, this means that the people in the various districts
have pitched their political organization according to these district lines for sixteen elections. This alone appears to give selection of these districts plausibility. Nor do the two changes detract
from the reasonableness of this selection. In both cases, districts
are split in two by separating out counties deemed to require
individual seats in the senate. The plaintiff is in a particularly
poor position to argue that the changes contribute to whimsy,
because his is one of the counties selected for such increase in representation. Further, Mr. Justice Clark seemed impressed by the
crazy-quilt pattern in Tennessee, where some single counties had
representatives, some had only influence in electing representatives
in larger districts, and some had both. In Michigan there is no
such complex overlapping of districts. There are thirty-four districts, each separate from the others. The thirty-four include the
whole state. Of course it is true that they are not all single-county
districts, but, since there are thirty-four senators and eighty-three
counties, this seems to be necessary. Except in Wayne, no county
is split, and in no instance are county lines crossed in drawing
district boundaries. The obvious convenience in the design of
county election machinery no doubt relieves this pattern from the
area of mere whim, and, conceding that, the design of districts
which will not cross county lines is bound to involve some degree
of difference in representation ratio.
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SIMON

The third of the 1962 Supreme Court decisions relating to
legislative apportionment was W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 228 a suit
brought to invalidate the New York apportionment of both house
and senate made under provisions of the New York state constitution. These provisions are different from those in Tennessee
in that the asserted rural bias is required by the constitution itself,
and different from those in Michigan in that in New York no
districts are directly defined. The General Assembly is called upon
to apportion according to a formula set out in the constitution.
The formula for the house allots one representative for each of
the state's sixty-two counties, regardless of population, an additional member for each county which has more than a ratio and
a half, and the balance are distributed to the counties having the
highest remainder in the order thereof.229 The formula for the
fifty-member senate requires the creation of fifty districts in which
no county shall be split, except for the purpose of creating two or
more districts within the same county, and provides that the districts so created shall be as nearly as practicable compact and contiguous and of equal population. The only limitation on the population basis of senate apportionment is the provision that no
county shall have four or more senators unless it has a full ratio
for each. 230
The Simon case presents an interesting comparison with Baker
and Scholle. In terms of the order of difference of the representation ratio as between rural and urban counties, Simon presented
almost as striking a cas,e as that demonstrated in Baker, and greater
differences than were shmm in Scholle. The smallest representative district, Schuyler County, has a population of 14,066, and the
largest, in Bronx County, I 15,000. In the senate the range is from
146,666 to 344,547. On the other hand, the integrity of county
representation being preserved, it cannot be said that, as in Tennessee, districts designed in the first instance to reflect population
have lost that element of rationality by the passage of time and
shifts in population, without taking on any other advertent hallmark of reasonable classification, or, as in Michigan, that the districts represent the coupling of counties in unexplainable fashion.
The case was heard by a three-judge court which held in a
22s
229
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two-to-one decision that there was here no irrationality which
would invalidate the New York system.231 The third judge, Judge
Waterman of the Second Circuit, did not pass on this point but
voted to dismiss the bill on the ground that the matter was not
justiciable.232
On appeal, the Supreme Court followed the pattern established in the Scholle case, remanding for reconsideration in light
of the opinion in Baker v. Carr. The opinion was short and per
curiam. As in the Scholle case, the majority consisted of Justices
Black, Brennan, Clark, Douglas, Stewart, White, and Chief Justice
Warren. This time there were no concurring opinions. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter took no part in the decision and Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. The decision in the Simon case adds little or nothing to that in Scholle v. Hare; the Court referred to its "wellestablished practice of a remand for consideration in the light
of a subsequent decision." 233 Mr. Justice Harlan felt that two of
the three judges on the three-judge court had decided the matter
on the merits and the Supreme Court should proceed to the correctness of the decision. As in Scholle v. Hare, he objected to
referring the case back to the district court for reconsideration
without providing any guidelines for decision on the merits.
The majority read the three opinions below as resting, one on
the ground of failure to state a claim, lack of equity, and lack of
justiciability, the second on absence of an allegation of discrimination against a particular racial or religious group, and the third
on absence of a justiciable question. "As in Scholle v. Hare ... ,"
said the Court, "we believe that the court below should be the
first to consider the merits of the federal constitutional claim,
free from any doubts as to its justiciability and as to the merits
of alleged arbitrary and invidious geographical discrimination." 234
The last phrase serves to cast a small ray of light on the Court's
Baker decision. In saying that remand will provide consideration
without doubt about "the merits of alleged arbitrary and invidious
geographical discrimination," the Court interprets the Baker decision as deciding that an allegation of "arbitrary and invidious"
geographical discrimination states a claim under the equal protection clause, and not simply that the question is a justiciable
one. It gives no hint of the Court's view as to what invidious or
arbitrary geographical discrimination might be.
231
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Taken together, Baker v. Carr, Scholle v. Hare, and W.M.C.A.,
Inc. v. Sirnon have made geographically-based differences in representation ratio a matter of judicial cognizance under the equal
protection clause, irrespective of a showing of discrimination as
to race or sex. There is nothing very shocking about this. If the
geographical basis of the classification will not protect it from
judicial scrutiny in the case of tJ.ie fifteenth amendment violation,
there seems to be no reason why it should in the case of violation
of the fourteenth. Were a gerrymander based upon race, the same
problems of adequate relief would present themselves. Nor is
this decision inconsistent with the precedents. Conceding that the
fourteenth amendment is applicable, however, it remains to apply
to the geographical representation cases the ordinary principles of
equal protection clause litigation.

IV.

APPLICATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

A. The Nature of the Right to Representation:

Poll or Point of View
This writer has suggested that division of a state into geographical subdivisions is always more of method than of substance, and
any attempt to gauge the fairness or constitutionality of such a
division should look to the underlying right.235 This principle
is illustrated by the method the Court employed in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot236 to distinguish Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh.231 The
essence of the complaint in Hunter, said the Court, per Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, was that if the plaintiff's property were by merger of
municipal governments brought within the city of Pittsburgh, he
would have to pay higher taxes. The Court said, "[I]f one principle clearly emerges from the numerous decisions of this Court
dealing with taxation it is that the Due Process Clause affords no
immunity against mere inequalities in tax burdens, nor does it
afford protection against their increase as an indirect consequence
of a State's exercise of its political powers."238 In Gomillion, on
the other hand, there was no assertion that there existed "mere
inequality" of voting strength, but an inequality based upon the
race of the plaintiffs. Turning to the underlying right to vote,
the definition of such a right depends ultimately upon one's con235
236
237
238

See Lucas, supra note 201.
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
207 U.S. 161 (1907).
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343 (1960).

1963]

LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT

765

ception of th~ nature and operation of republican government.
One simple and straightforward theory of democracy is grounded
upon the assumption that majorities can in any event control by
force. If one leaves decisions to force, there is a certain risk to life
and limb in determining which group constitutes a majority.
Therefore we count them first and avoid the bloodshed. In other
words, we count polls rather than crack them. Where the entire
population votes, as where issues are put to referendum, there is
a certain validity to this view. Every person is taken to be the
only true authority on his own self-interest and the role of the
election official is not to question a man's vote, but to count it.
The result has at least the virtue of representing the will of a
majority of the population. Even here, a line can be drawn between minority rule and the requirement tliat action await more
than a simple majority. Our tradition is replete with examples of
the preference for inaction until the advent of a degree of consensus greater than fifty-one to forty-nine. 239
Representative government adds a completely new dimension.
There is no direct connection between the views of the legal representative of a particular poll, and those of its owner. This is
true because, on any given issue, the views of a voter may be minority views locally. Indeed in any representative district there
are to be found those who talked, worked, and voted against the
legal representative. It is possible, for instance, that there are Mississippi voters who consider that a Javits or a Morse represents
them better than an Eastland, or Illinois residents who consider
a Byrd represents their point of view better than a Douglas. On
the federal level the fact that some of the representation units are
previously sovereign entities is a complicating factor because there
are venerable loyalties to the state as a political unit. Even here,
however, interest groups span state lines and the national management of major party efforts makes the lines even hazier. At the
local level there are some local loyalties, to cities or towns, or to
counties or regions. They are much less fixed, however, and it
seems fair to say that there are few voters who identify their interests as primarily tied up with groups wholly within the city
or county.
The problem of design in a representative system, then, is one
of insuring representation to a wide variety of interests and points
of view, rather than insuring simply that as a formal matter every
239
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person cast a vote for the same number of representatives, whether
or not he has any appreciable influence in the election of any of
them. Conceivably this could be done by a system which would
identify interest groups and allot them representation directly:
rich man, poor man, beggar man, thief. A scheme of proportional
representation in a multi-party system might approximate this
approach. It would raise perhaps more problems than it would
solve, however, so recourse has generally been had to indirect
methods of insuring interest representation.
The most workable indirect alternative is, of course, geographical districts. The assumption is that like people are apt to live
contiguously, or at least that different areas of the state live with
different problems, with all of which the state must deal, and that
rational decision on these affairs is aided by the presence of representatives who have lived with them. Representative assemblies
are, after all, only partially devices for measuring popular will;
they are also deliberative in nature. It is assumed that when the
views of a wide sampling of the public have been aired and discussed, action will result or not, according to rational consensus.
This is not to say that there may not be issues on which consensus
cannot be achieved, but rather that all representative schemes are
designed only partly with an eye to the resolution of such problems. In many instances a preference has been shown for leaving
them unsolved until more. than a majority can be obtained in
support of a particular solution. Sometimes, indeed, we have
taken them out of the democratic process altogether.
The design of representation schemes obviously reflects a compromise between notions of majority rule on the one hand, and
representation of a variety of points of view on the other, and
where the geographical districts which serve as the basis for interest representation were designed as a secondary device, never
intended to represent mere acreage or mere population, it should
be obvious that their rationality cannot be measured either in
hides or in heads. To state that there is a difference in population in geographical districts is to say no more than that population was not the only consideration employed in their design.
Skins are politically neutral, and presumably if the state were
divided into districts as nearly square as possible, and each containing exactly the same number of inhabitants, there would be
some sampling of opinion statewide. But what would result would
be a weighting of the scales which would depend upon concentration or dispersion of persons with like interests. Concentration
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is to the advantage of small minority groups, for the concentrated
interest is apt to be guaranteed some representation. Dispersion of
interests, however, carries with it a better chance of control. Thus,
in a hypothetical State with 110 inhabitants divided into ten districts each with eleven inhabitants, each interest group which can
muster six votes in the same district will have a representative,
while a group which can deliver a total of fifty, but no more
than five in any district, will go without. Theoretically, a group
with seventy-four votes could fail to control the assembly, though
sixty votes properly spread could elect one hundred percent of
the membership.
Life is not lived in squares and circles, and where legislatures
have identified groups geographically concentrated in areas of irregular design, they have not hesitated to depart from geometric
symmetry to define districts which have some political cohesion.
In doing so, they show their hand, and where the group geographically delineated is one afforded particular constitutional protection, as in Gomillion, the Court will no doubt go behind the geometry. The whole pattern is complicated by the existence of general
function units of government. States are divided into counties,
townships, cities, and towns. Sometimes the cities are part of the
surrounding counties, sometimes not. Not only is it an administrative convenience to use these pre-existing units as representation districts, but to a limited extent they represent interest
groups in and of themselves, for the fact that a voter must solve
many problems as a resident of a given unit gives him a certain
amount in common with his fellow electors in the unit. For these
reasons it is common to allocate representation with reference to
county lines. This presents a complication of very real proportions. Counties vary widely in population, size, and shape, as well
as in degree of political cohesion. Where a single county does not
contain a sufficient number of inhabitants to justify individual
representation, it is coupled with another, and the simple problem
of fractions may introduce numerical inequalities as great as one
hundred percent. Also, the coupling of a small county with a
large one may leave the voters in the small county with little or
no effective influence in an election held within the joint district.
Examples of these problems can be seen in both the Tennessee
and Michigan patterns. In Tennessee, Moore County is the second smallest county in the state in terms of population, and also
the second smallest in area. It is surrounded by four counties,
each of which has a population which is more than two-thirds of
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the portion, entitling it, under the state constitution, to have a
separate representative. In some other areas, overlapping districts
have been created, and that could have been done in the case of
Moore. For instance, Moore could have been coupled with one
of the others in a so-called floterial district. But all the other four
are already over-represented because of the two-thirds fraction
rule dictated by the constitution of Tennessee. The smallest of
the four, Coffee County, has a voter population of 13,406. Moore
County has a voter population of 2,340. If there is any significant
difference between the interests of residents of Moore and Coffee
counties, that of the Moore residents would always be subordinated
to that of the Coffee residents. Thus the effect of coupling Moore
County with Coffee is in practical terms to permit Coffee County,
with only roughly two-thirds of the portion, to elect two representatives, while leaving the residents of Moore County with no
effective power to select any. Since we have seen that the political
alignment of interests does not necessarily follow along county
lines, the reverse may be true. If political views are in delicate
balance in the four surrounding counties, and monolithic in
Moore, appending Moore to any other county might have the
result of changing these balances completely.
In Michigan, the smallest of the senate districts is the thirtysecond. It consists of Baraga, Houghton, Keweenaw, and Ontonagon counties which are located at the western end of Michigan's
Upper Peninsula on Lake Superior. The Upper Peninsula includes 29 percent of Michigan's land mass. It is separated from
the Lower Peninsula by five miles of water, recently spanned by
the Mackinac Bridge. The population of the Upper Peninsula,
according to the 1960 census, is 302,648. If the exact portion were
applied to the Upper Peninsula as a unit, it would be entitled to
one and two-thirds senators, or if a major fraction formula is
applied, to two. Under the provisions of the 1952 amendment, it
is given three. In view of the fact that it is a large and sparselypopulated area separated from the balance of the state by water,
and remote from the more heavily-populated portions of the state,
can it be said that it is palpably unreasonable to .provide it with
representation no more disproportionate than that? If it is conceded that it would not be arbitrary to assign three senators to the
Upper Peninsula, what of the distribution of the three senate
seats in this area? What has been done is to split off the Keweenaw Peninsula area (with a population of 61,008, and including
the four counties mentioned above) as one district; roughly the
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western half of the remainder of the Upper Peninsula, containing
117,233 inhabitants and four counties, as the second (the thirtyfirst senatorial district); and the eastern half with a population of
124,407, and seven counties, as the third (the thirtieth senatorial
district). Since the thirty-second district is surrounded on three
sides by water and extends sixty-five miles into Lake Superior, one
could guess at all manner of special interests which might be
shared by the inhabitants of this area, and which would not be
represented in the state senate at all were the area to be coupled
with enough of the southern or eastern counties in the Upper
Peninsula to make the district contain a full portion of population.
The situation is made worse by the physical location of the counties in the thirty-second, for it cannot be joined with any group
of counties not contiguous to it.
Of course it is true that leaving apportionment to a legislative
assembly which represents at any given time a particular alignment of political interests is, in a sense, if one may paraphrase
Bentham's remark about the elevation of practicing attorneys to
the bench, to make a procuress mistress of a girls' school. As we
have seen, without regard to equal numbers within a district a
minority of thirty-six can control a majority of seventy-four, where
a 110-person universe is divided into ten districts and enough ingenuity is employed in drawing the district lines. This means
that a majority may perpetuate its control until it drops below
the number required to control fifty-one percent of the votes in
fifty-one percent of the districts. With unequal districts, theoretically even this floor disappears. Unless it appears that this
nadir has been reached, however, or that the Constitution requires
formal equality, there seems to be no difference between effective
disfranchisement of interest groups through ingenuity in drawing
the district lines on the one hand, and differences in the number
of persons residing in the various districts on the other.
Since it has been suggested in none of the apportionment cases
that disfranchisement has proceeded this far, we are left with the
existence of the requirement of numerical, or formal, equality.
In a number of places it has been shown that there is no historical
justification for the statement that the Constitution required such
equality, either at the time of its adoption, or after the adoption
of the fourteenth amendment. This does not mean that the concept of equal protection might not grow to include such a requirement, for, as the Court said in the Brown case, it came to the conclusion that education had changed in importance, and that even

770

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

though it might be conceded that earlier Courts would not require
unsegregated schools, that did not foreclose this one from reading
the effects of segregation in the light of what we know about it
today.
In the area of representation, can any practical argument of
change of circumstances be marshalled to justify the requirement
of formal equality in representation districts? A good case can
be made for the directly opposite proposition. When city populations were a small minority interest in most state affairs, direct
intervention in their local affairs was common. In the middle of
the nineteenth· century state legislatures provided a city hall for
Philadelphia, in Maryland controlled the purchase of such ordinary city equipment as an individual fire engine, and in New
York and elsewhere set up special commissions to take over local
police administration.240 Today virtually every state has adopted
constitutional limitations on the enactment by state legislatures of
"local" legislation.241 Many states have protected the urban management of local affairs through constitutional home rule provisions,242 and, as a general pattern, legislative action with respect
to cities and towns has steered an unswerving course toward
greater local power.243 As city populations have grown, they have
had an ever-increasing impact upon statewide elections, and it
must be remembered that control of the governor's mansion carries with it control of the executive veto, and the not inconsiderable power to control executive discretion and to make an everincreasing number of appointments. In addition, cities have
wielded an enormous power in the selection of national officers.
It may be presumed, for instance, that since Senators are chosen
on a statewide basis, an urban majority within the state can control
their election.
As urban populations have grown to and beyond half the
population in some states, the problem has been one of whether
this particular grouping of interests shall be permitted to control
the entire state. Its desire to do so, in addition to the usual motives of power and patronage, may have stemmed to some extent
from the fact that general function districts have often been out
of line with living arrangements, and cities have felt that the efficient management of the affairs of large metropolitan areas can
240 See PATE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ADMINISTRATION 60 (1954).
241 See INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 939 (2d ed. 1959).
242 See id. at 714.
243 Indeed, frequently the powers of cities under legislative

charters or optional
charter laws are greater than under many of the home rule provisions.
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be accomplished only by such control. Home rule, they feel, is not
enough, because it does not permit coercion of areas outside the
governmental unit. Control of the legislature often carries with it
control of the design of units of local government, and, even where
it does not, it is often necessary for effective efforts to amend the
state constitution.
It should be stated here that the disproportion in representation between urban and rural areas is not by any means the only
limit to the absolute exercise of the powers of majorities within
the states, or within the national government. A requirement of
more than a majority to propose or adopt at referendum a constitutional amendment, or to incur obligations, is also in the teeth
of the concept that wherever a group of political interests can
control fifty-one percent of the votes within the political unit, it
may force its will upon the minority.244 Home-rule provisions, long
the objective of urban populations, limitations on the power to
tax, and a host of other strings tied to the legislature's power to
rule, are all cut from the same cloth. Nor is disproportionate
representation a single class, for the bargain can be drawn in a
number of ways. In the United States government it is in the
nature of a veto. Geographical minorities are protected by overrepresentation in the Senate, while majorities are protected in the
House of Representatives. This is a pattern followed in several
of the states, and indeed, the pattern adopted by the people of
Michigan when they approved the constitutional amendment of
1952. In Tennessee, geographical apportionment, as amended by
the passage of years, preserves in the rural areas the power to rule
absolutely, though even there the statement can be made only
with respect to these two of the many alignments which no doubt
exist. Since the senate districts are different from those employed
in the lower house, different interests may be represented in one
than in the other. For instance, to the extent that their interests are
different from those of the city of Knoxville, the residents of Roane
County are not in a position to elect a representative to the Tennessee senate, for they are placed in a senate district including that
city, and the Knoxville voting population constitutes nearly seventy percent of the total. In the lower house, on the other hand,
Roane constitutes a single-county district.
As between urban and rural areas, the allocation of seats in
the senate on a basis other than by population, coupled with a
lower house apportioned on the basis of population alone, is
244 See,

e.g.,

GRAVES, STATE CON5IlTUTIONAL REVISION

26 (1960).
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nothing but a compromise made necessary by the fact that the
unit for democratic action was determined at a time when there
was a better balance between interest groups and population, and
the assumption could be made that on most issues the fifty-one
to forty-nine vote would be acceptable to the minority. As an
increasingly large proportion of the state's population has become
concentrated in cities and highly interested in the problems of
cities, this minimum degree of homogeneity has become doubtful
and the people have decided that it is better to operate by stalemate and bargin as a process for achieving consensus at a higher
level.
In summary, though there may be an abstract right to participate in general elections in whatever political units one finds one's
self, the very nature of representative government based upon geographical selection places some voters on one side and some on
the other. Therefore, there will always be voters whose viewpoint
or political stamp will not be represented by the person selected
to represent him in the legislative council. If one views the right
to representation as a device for achieving expression of the voter's view, and further as a right personal to each voter, the right
is not one susceptible of full vindication in any system of representative government based upon representation of geographical
areas, and even its approximation is made impossible by a requirement of compactness, contiguity, and districts of equal population. Such a system would simply substitute the cast of the dice
in terms of concentration and dispersion for some more reasonable
effort to see that a wide variety of points of view achieve representation in legislative deliberations. The requirement of equality
of populations within districts, uncoupled with a requirement of
compactness and contiguity, would place a floor under the number of votes required to control the political institutions in a
given jurisdiction, the floor being half plus one of the number of
votes in one district times half plus one of the number of representative districts. This may be desirable in itself, but the advantages should be weighed against the drawbacks. There are
administrative reasons for preferring compactness and contiguity
of districts where possible, and the coupling of general function
and representative districts. The requirement of equality of numbers may face the legislature or the constitutional convention with
a choice between the efficient operation of the election process
and the desire to see to it that important but geographically dispersed segments of the population find expression in legislative
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deliberations over the affairs of the state. It should also be noted
that there has never been a showing that geographical representation not precisely equated to population as a practical matter has
ever resulted in control by so small a minority. Its interdiction,
then, may result in positive disadvantages without any concomitant
practical advantage.
B. The Function of the Federal Courts

It is obviously within the power and the duty of the Supreme
Court to determine whether or not the equal protection clause
requires equality of population within representation districts.
History indicates that it does not. 245 Present practice indicates that
it does not. The precedents of the Court indicate that it does not. 246
Finally, four of the eight Justices sitting in Baker v. Carr have
stated that it does not. 247
But this is not to say that no problem remains under the equal
protection clause. By way of analogy, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
stated in his Gomillion opinion that the equal protection clause
does not afford protection against mere inequalities in tax burden.248 He would not gainsay, however, that the Court will examine a tax statute where it is alleged that invidious discrimination
among taxpayers similarly situated underlies the tax. 249 He simply
stated the rule that where there is no requirement of precise equality, an allegation of the lack of it makes no case under the fourteenth amendment. He suggested, for example, that were the state
to arrange its representation system so as to discriminate against
Negroes, or Jews, or red-headed people, the equal protection clause
would come into play.250
Mr. Justice Douglas suggested that a showing that the differences in representation ratio between areas are very great is in
itself enough to require that the plaintiff be afforded an opportunity to prove "invidious discrimination." This view also has
245 See, e.g., the historical material in the Frankfurter dissent in Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. at 302-24. See also the opinion of Edwards, J., in Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. at 85,
104 N.W.2d at 107.
240 E.g., MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
247 Justices Clark, Harlan, Frankfurter, and Stewart. The views of Mr. Justice
Brennan and the Chief Justice are unknown. Presumably Justices Black and Douglas
believe that the Constitution requires substantial equality of representation, though
even Mr. Justice Douglas states that there is room for weighting. See text supra at 748.
248 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343 (1960).
240 E.g., l\!r. Justice Frankfurter joined the majority in Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949), and in Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S.
620 (1946).
2fi0

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

774

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

analogies in the cases decided under the equal protection and
commerce clauses. Thus differences in tax treatment of outsiders
which are small enough plausibly to be taken as efforts at equalization of burden or necessary to assure collection may pass muster, while large inequalities may show by their very size that they
are intended to place the outsider at a competitive disadvantage.201
But these cases can be said to rest upon the fact that the insideroutsider classification is a prohibited one, and the degree of the
difference is an element in proof that the prohibited classification
is the one which was employed. The equal protection cases dealing
with distribution of tax burdens within the state indicate that a
necessary element of the plaintiff's case is a showing not only that
he is treated differently from other taxpayers, but that he is treated
differently from those similarly situated. If the Court is convinced
that property is of a different kind or character, for instance, differences in tax rate will not be corrected.252 Similarly, where a ta.x
is levied upon one business or activity, the Court will not insist
that it be levied on another.253 In these cases the degree of difference is not important. If the state may classify property into real
and personal, tangible, railroad property, machinery and tools,
etc., and may apply different rates to each, then it may make these
differences in rate small or large, as it sees fit, or indeed may tax
some and leave others untaxed. If a state may classify two businesses into different classes, then it may levy high taxes on one
and none at all on another.254 These cases are different from those
involving the determination of proper classes because the general
distribution of tax burden is thought to be one largely of legislative discretion. The allocation of benefits also comes under this
heading. Before a citizen can persuade a court to interfere with
the state's decision to pay benefits to some, or provide services to
others, it must be shown that the class is improper. If the class is
a permissible one, the amount of the benefit, or the degree of di£See, e.g., Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 516 (1926).
See, e.g., Charleston Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 191 (1945).
See also Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 159 (1930).
253 See, e.g., the statement of the Court in Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522,
526-27 (1959): "The State may impose different specific tax.es upon different trades and
professions and may vary the rate of excise upon various products • . . ," and see the
cases cited therein. See also Sholley, Equal Protection in Tax Legislation, 24 VA. L. REv.
229 (1938).
254 In Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87 (1935), the amount of the tax was $240,000.
In Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937), the tax on a local merchant operating ten grocery stores was $10 each, while the tax on a national chain with
600, operating only one in Louisiana, was $550 for that one. See Sholley, supra note 253,
at 255.
251

252
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ference between services provided, is within the discretion of the
state.
Generally, geographical differences have fallen into this second
category of cases, for the reason that the differences between populations situated in different areas are so many that it is impossible
to say that there exists no reasonable basis for the classification.
Occasionally, as in the case of racial discrimination, or in the
definition of special assessment districts, it is possible to see
through the geography to identify an impermissible classifi.cation.255 In the annexation cases, on the other hand, the burdens
and benefits of living within the city limits are so hard to identify
and quantify that the Court has been reluctant to attempt the
task of weighing them.256
This is not to say that geography per se is a proper basis of
classification. Where the Court is able to identify geographical
areas identical in every respect germane to the purposes for which
the classification was made, it sometimes has inquired into the
legality of differences in treatment. If the city zones one area differently from another without any supporting differences in situation, it runs the risk of unconstitutionality. 257 Hypothetically, if
it were to split a single tract of identical residences into two zones
and apply one tax rate to one and a higher to another, can there
be any doubt that the Court would apply the usual standards of
tax equality?258
Applying Mr. Justice Douglas's reasoning in his Baker opinion,
there is no rationality in treating one voter differently just because he lives in one place or another. Where the differences in
representation are small, it may be assumed that some other good
255 See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See also Myles Salt Co. v.
Board of Comm'rs, 239 U.S. 478 (1916).
256 See, e.g., Texas ex rel. Pan Am. Prod. Co. v. City of Texas City, 355 U.S. 603
(1958). See also Comment, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 279, 315-17 (1959).
257 See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), reversing 260 Mass.
441, 157 N.E. 618 (1927). In the zoning cases the issue is generally framed as one of
the reasonableness of a land-use limitation, rather than as one of equality of treatment.
In cases in which the forbidden use is permitted to property owners whose premises
are cheek and jowl with the restricted parcel, however, it could be framed as a denial
of equal protection rather than due process. See De Lano v. City of Tulsa, 26 F.2d 640,
645 (8th Cir. 1928). There the rejection of the equal protection argument as applied
to the facts of the case illustrates the difficulties of controlling the exercise of powers
involving broad discretion. "Equality of protection of the law in such cases requires
consideration of the relative conditioxs as applied to the particular property and other
properties and locations within the scope of the ordinance." Id. at 645-46.
258 Cf. People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Allyn, 393 Ill. 154, 65 N.E.2d 392 (1946), brought
under the Illinois constitutional requirement that property taxes be levied ad valorem.
In the Schlaeger case the inequality of the effective rate was brought about by differences in ratio of true to assessed value in two different counties, and the court relied
upon the factual nature of the assessment process to justify its refusal to intervene.

776

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

and sufficient reason may support them. Where they are grossand Mr. Justice Clark would add, where they appear randomthere arises a presumption that they are not justified by any difference in situation germane to the purpose of the classification.
Certainly it might be conceded that were his horribles to take place,
for example, were the city of Memphis to be split into two wards,
one with a population of 10,000 and the other with a population of
386,000, and the first were given ten seats on the municipal council
and the second, one, the difference would be hard to rationalize on
the basis of any legitimate objective of representative government.
But this is to say only that there comes a point beyond which
differences of degree become differences of kind. By way of analogy
to the tax and regulation cases, either a tax or a regulation can be
so onerous to a given calling or property owner so as to be treated
as a prohibition or confiscation. When this point is reached, the
Court will inquire into the power to prohibit or the power to
seize.259 In like fashion, a difference in representation might at some
point be looked upon as a disfranchisement in disguise. In such
a case, surely the Court would shift the inquiry from one governed
by permissible standards of distribution to one governed by standards of exclusion.260
Difficulties of relief remain, regardless of the substantive standard employed. Of course the federal courts should avoid affront
to the processes of the state wherever it is possible to do so. And
Mr. Justice Frankfurter is no doubt correct in asserting that courts
are sometimes faced with situations which make any available
mode of relief worse than the evil they are designed to correct.
This is not always true, however. In the Gomillion case, for example, the declaration of invalidity of the Alabama statute had
the result simply of effecting a return to old district lines. As the
Illinois history suggests, this may be worse than nothing in the
case of long failure to redistrict. It is not true that all such cases
259 Where there is the power to prohibit, of course, the fact that taxation is employed as the method of effecting the prohibition will not invalidate the exercise of the
power. See, e.g., Rast v. Van Deman &: Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342 (1916). There the Court
was not convinced that the tax in question was prohibitory, but went on to say that,
assuming that it was, the business taxed (coupons redeemable in merchandise) could
be prohibited consistent with the due process clause.
260 Complete exclusion from representation on the basis of geography has been
rare, but there have been such cases. See People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463 (1867). See
also 2 COOLEY, CONSTlTUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 1394 (8th ed. 1927). In the Maynard case,
the legislature had created a new county by splitting off from another county one whole
township and parts of two others. The court said the effect of this would be to permit
the whole township to elect the entire governing board, depriving the residents of the
scraps of their votes in county elections. It held that this would be in violation of the
state constitution.
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present the same difficulties. In the congressional reapportionment
cases, federal statutes cover the case by providing for elections at
large. In the Georgia county unit system cases, the primary laws
could be saved without the offending method of counting the
votes. Equitable relief is discretionary to a large extent, and the
Court can control any absence of good sense which district courts
from time to time might display. It goes without saying that Mr.
Justice Frankfurter was correct in suggesting that the federal
courts should refrain from simply shouting down a rain barrel
and should limit their activities to the correction of evils amenable to judicial methods. This they will do if they follow the
general principles of equal protection litigation. It remains to
be seen whether the district courts will adhere to these general
guides or will read Baker v. Carr as a license to supervise legislative apportionment to the end of achieving a system consonant
with their own notions of a proper polity. So far, evidence is
limited and conflicting.
V.

PosT-BAKER DEVELOPMENTS

A. The Baker Case on Remand
In appraising the reaction of the federal district and state courts
to these cases in the light of the Baker,261 Scholle,262 and Simon263
opinions, it is useful first to follow those three cases on remand.
The subsequent history of Baker v. Carr vindicates Mr. Justice
Clark's view on the necessity of remand for trial. At a pre-trial
conference the Attorney General of the state appeared and stated
that he was authorized to advise the court that the Governor
of Tennessee would issue a call for a special session of the legislature to consider the question of reapportionment in view of the
holding of the Supreme Court. He then moved for a stay of proceedings until the General Assembly could be convened and could
act upon the matter.264 The court reserved its ruling on the motion, and June 11, 1962, was set as the date for further hearing.
By June 7, the General Assembly had enacted legislation reapportioning the membership of both the senate and lower house, and
this legislation had been signed by the governor.
The district court began its consideration of the new T ennessee apportionment acts by patching together a standard from snip201
262
263
204

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Scholle v. Hare, 369 U.S. 429 (1962).
W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 370 U.S. 190 (1962).
See Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
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pets from the various opinions in the Baker case. It noticed that
Mr. Justice Clark felt that the original Tennessee scheme was
wholly irrational and arbitrary, and linked Mr. Justice Stewart to
this view because of language in his opinion describing the complaint, despite the fact that Mr. Justice Stewart refused to call the
scheme arbitrary and carefully limited his decision to the justiciability of apportionment questions. It quoted from Mr. Justice
Douglas to the effect that the equal protection clause prohibits invidious discriminations, and stated that "there can be no doubt
that the majority of the Supreme Court ruled in this case, as stated
by Mr. Justice Clark, at least sub silentio, that invidious discriminations were present in the 1901 reapportionment statute and that
it fell far short of the standards of the equal protection clause."265
It also quoted from the Brennan opinion this further characterization of the complaint, "the injury which appellants assert is that
this classification disfavors the voters in the counties in which they
reside, placing them in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable
inequality vis-a-vis voters in irrationally favored counties,"260 added
Mr. Justice Douglas's reference to "egregious injustices," 267 mixed
them all together, and came up with this question: "Do the statutes establish classifications predicated upon a rational basis, or are
they utterly arbitrary and lacking in rationality?" 268 This is, of
course, the Clark test.
It then became necessary to inquire into whether the new apportionment acts fell within the stated test. The court conceded
that in overall plan the apportionment of the lower house had
eliminated or mollified some of the most glaring inequities-without reference to what these were-and that it could be explained
in some of its major features upon a basis which the court was not
prepared to say was within itself irrational, but added that "it
nevertheless possesses some inequities and inequalities which in
our opinion should be corrected or removed in order to avoid
grave doubts as to its constitutionality."269 It thereupon picked
out a number of instances of treatment it considered unequal,
much in the fashion of Mr. Justice Clark's illustrations of lack of
pattern. With the exception of two of these instances, they all
relate to the fractional representation of counties in so-called
floterial districts. Thus the court suggested that it is unfair to
265
266
267
268
269

Id. at 345.
Id. at 344.
See 369 U.S. at 250 n.5 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 345 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
Id. at 345.
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provide Anderson County (33,554) with a single representative
while Rutherford (30,347) has an individual representative and
also participates with Cannon (5,235) and Dekalb (6,660) in a
floterial district. 270 The other two instances of doubt were the
over-representation of Sevier and Fayette counties. According to
voter population they were both under the two-thirds fraction but
were both given individual representation. 271 The defendants argued that these two counties were given full representation because their total population would have entitled them to full
representation, had the distribution been on this basis. It was said
that these were the only two counties in which this would be true.
The court rejected this explanation with the statement that these
were the only two instances in which total population rather than
voter population was taken as the basis of representation. 272 Employment of a standard of one full representative to each county
which has two-thirds of the portion based upon either total population or voter population seemingly was the one employed. The
court did not explain why this is not an acceptable standard under
the equal protection clause. It seems to say that it is impermissible
in that it applies one standard to one group, and another standard
to another. This is of course arrant nonsense, for, if both total
population and voter population are permissible standards under
the equal protection clause, there appears no reason whatever for
supposing that they cannot be used in the alternative in providing
minimum representation.
With regard to the apportionment of the Senate, the court
perceived Mr. Justice Clark's "crazy quilt." 273 The overall variation in ratio was about two and one-half to one. As between rural
areas, the court saw a bias in favor of the eastern counties. As between urban districts, there was a difference in representation ratio
as great as thirty-seven percent between Sullivan County (Bristol)
and the si.xth senate district-Knox and Anderson Counties (Knoxville and suburbs). The court concluded that the act apportioning
the senate was "utterly arbitrary and lacking in rationality. Its
only consistent pattern is one of invidious discrimination." 274
There was no discussion at all of rural bias as such. No figures
were given as to differences in ratio as between major centers of
population and more sparsely-populated areas. As far as the ration210
211
212
273
274

Id. at 346.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Id. at 346-47.
Id. at 348.
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ale of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the acts goes, then,
it is based upon Mr. Justice Clark's formula. The equal protection
clause requires rational pattern and differences must not be willynilly and unexplained.
The court did not stop here, however. It proceeded to provide guidelines for the enactment of a statute which will in its
opinion provide a constitutionally valid apportionment plan. The
minimum standards of equality proposed by the court were these:
the two-thirds rule of the Tennessee constitution can be applied to
the apportionment of the house of representatives; if so, however,
the apportionment of the senate must be on a true basis of population without regard to fractions; on the other hand, if there is
an apportionment of the senate on a rational basis other than
strict adherence to population, the house of representatives must
be apportioned on a true population basis without regard to the
two-thirds fraction rule.275
This is not quite the standard required by the constitution
of Tennessee, but almost. The Tennessee constitution requires
that counties having two-thirds of the portion must be given
separate representation in the house of representatives, and further
that, in apportioning senate seats, insofar as possible the fractions
lost by the application of the two-thirds rule be made up to the
counties with voter population above the portion.276
This standard leaves at large the question of what rational
pattern could be employed in apportioning the senate. If one
takes the court's reaction to the 1962 act apportioning the house
of representatives, relatively small differences in treatment may be
deemed unfair and unconstitutional. This is not to say, however,
that were differences consistent with some overall formula, the
court would consider that the same order of difference would constitute irrationality. Thus a system which was based upon a formula designed to reflect population density might be all right. To
Mr. Justice Clark's requirement of rationality, then, the district
court has added the requirement of strict population apportionment in at least one house of the legislature. Both must be rational
and one must be by the poll.277
The problem of relief in Baker v. Carr, as in all such cases, was
a puzzling one. It will be remembered that the Tennessee Supreme
Court had held that, were it to declare the 1901 act unconstitutional, there would be no legal legislature to perform the function
Id. at 349.
Ibid.
an Ibid.
275
276
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of passing a valid apportionment statute, and the state would be
in chaos. Mr. Justice Douglas had tossed this problem off with the
observation that the contrary opinion had been expressed by the
Supreme Court of Iowa, an opinion which he said is "plainly
correct."278 The district court was somewhat more cautious. It
read the decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Kidd v.
McCanless2 70 as holding that only where there has been a judicial
determination of the illegality of a statute under which an officer
holds his office such an officer cannot be a de facto officer. After
expressing some doubt as to whether this is binding upon the
federal courts enforcing constitutional rights, it proceeded to
"find and hold" that the doctrine had no application to the expression of views of unconstitutionality by the court, where the
court expressly withholds final judgment, including the "declaration of invalidity." This, the court continued, will permit legal
elections to be held under the I 962 statutes, and the legislature
"to act with the express sanction of the Court to effect the necessary remedial measures and consequently in 'good faith' as far as
its authority is concerned."280
This disposition of the case leaves all the issues at large until
June 3, 1963, when the Tennessee Legislature will either enact
an apportionment statute satisfactory to the district court, or not.
The court spoke of its method of handling the situation as avoiding "a far more drastic form of relief," without specifying what
that form might be. And so we leave the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee and the governor and
General Assembly of that no longer so sovereign state to their game
of "ducks and drakes," and proceed to Michigan.
B. The Scholle Case on Remand

In the Scholle case, it will be remembered that the Michigan
Supreme Court had decided in favor of the 1952 amendment by
a margin of four to three,281 with the majority enjoying the vote
of a fifth member of the eight-man court who was of the opinion
that it was beyond the power of the Michigan court to correct the
abuse. 282 The case was remanded for reconsideration in light of
what had been said in Baker v. Carr. It could be expected that
278 Baker v. Carr, 367 U.S. at 250 n.5. See Cedar Rapids v. Cox, 252 Iowa 948, 108
N.W.2d 253 (1961),
270 Kidd v. l\fcCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956).
280 Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 350 (l\f.D. Tenn. 1962).
281 See te.xt supra at 758.
282 Black,

J.
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Justice Black of the Michigan court would reverse his position and
vote for a declaration that the amendment was unconstitutional.
This he did. Since Justices Carr, Kelly and Dethmers had not
seen a violation of the equal protection clause in the case when first
heard, their view on remand might be expected to depend upon
whether they took Mr. Justice Stewart at his word about the extent of the majority holding in Baker v. Carr, or, like the federal
district court in Tennessee, followed Mr. Justice Clark's suggestion
that the message of the majority went to the merits as well. Clearly
they read the holding in the Stewart form, but added that even
if one supposes Baker to rule on the merits of the constitutional
claim in Tennessee, the fact that the differences in representation
ratio existed in both houses there distinguishes the Michigan case.
In short, Justices Carr, Kelly, and Dethmers, stuck to their guns.
By the time the Scholle case was reheard, Justice Edwards had left
the court. If, as Mr. Justice Harlan suggested, the Edwards opinion had been grounded flatly on the merits, this change in court
personnel had the effect of destroying the majority of four. In
this connection it is worthy of notice that Edwards' place was
taken by Justice Adams, the former attorney general of the state
who had argued the case before the original Scholle court. Because
of this connection, Justice Adams disqualified himself. Though
of course one cannot be certain that an advocate's views will follow him onto the bench,283 the decision of the court after the second Scholle hearing, resting as it does on a majority not large
enough to grant relief where the full court is sitting, does not say
the last word on the standards to be applied in measuring the
rationality of senate apportionment.284 If the Michigan constitution were subsequently amended to provide a senate plan in all
respects similar, it is by no means certain that the court would
strike it down.285
283 See, e.g., The License Cases (Thurlow v. Massachusetts), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504,
575 (1847), where Mr. Chief Justice Taney eats the arguments he had made in Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). But Mr. Chief Justice Taney had twenty
years in which to convince himself that he was wrong.
284 In the November 1962 election, Justice Adams was replaced by Justice O'Hara,
leaving the Michigan court split evenly between Democrats and Republicans.
285 Under the proposed new constitution of Michigan, to be submitted to the voters
on April 1, 1963, and if approved, to take effect on January 1, 1964, the lower house
would be apportioned among ll0 single-member representative districts substantially
according to population. Counties containing seven-tenths of one percent of the state's
population would be entitled to separate representation. The senate would be apportioned among thirty-eight single-member districts on the basis of apportionment factors.
The apportionment factors of each county would be determined by taking the sum of
its percentage of the state's population multiplied by four, and its percentage of the
state's land area. Reliance upon legislative apportionment would be abandoned in favor
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In granting relief the Michigan Supreme Court was not so
cautious as was the district court in Tennessee. The new attorney
general, reversing the position taken by his predecessor, had
dropped the argument on the merits, and had asked that the whole
matter be postponed until the state legislature could enact a new
senate apportionment. The majority of the court did not follow
this suggestion. It declared the 1952 amendment unconstitutional
and enjoined the holding of the August 1962 primaries under its
provisions.286
The second Scholle decision by the Michigan court was handed
down on July 18, 1962. The primary elections were scheduled for
August 20. Application for stay of the state court's order was made
to Mr. Justice Stewart, to permit application for certiorari to review the decision, and the stay was granted. Certiorari has been
applied for, 287 so the Michigan apportionment scheme, and the
general question of geographical representation in one house balanced by popular representation in the other, will be back before
the Court this term, assuming, of course, that the question is not
ducked by a denial of the certiorari petition.
C. The Simon Case on Remand

W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon288 was reheard by the same threejudge court which decided it initially. This time Judge Waterman
joined in the decision that the New York constitutional provision
and the apportionment enacted under it on the merits do not
violate the equal protection clause. From Baker v. Carr and the
various cases decided by the district courts since the Baker case,
Judge Levet formulated five tests: (1) rationality, (2) presence of
a historical basis, (3) existence of possible remedies if gross inequality exists, (4) geography, including accessibility of representatives to their electors, and (5) whether the court is called
upon to invalidate solemnly enacted state constitutions and laws.289
Applying these tests to the facts in New York, Judge Levet saw
nothing irrational about the New York formula, providing, as it
of decennial apportionment by an eight-member bipartisan commission, with provision
for an additional two members in the event that a third party polls 25% of the gubernatorial vote at the last general election at which a governor was elected preceding
each apportionment.
Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, ll6 N.W.2d 350 (1962).
31 U.S.L. WEEK 3147 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1962) (No. 517).
208 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), appeal docketed, 31 U.SL. WEEK 3132 (U.S.
Sept. 26, 1962) (No. 460).
280 Id, at 374.
286
287
288
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does, minimum representation to each county. He found that there
is sound historical reason for choosing the county as the unit of
representation. As an available remedy he pointed out that the
New York constitution provides for a referendum every twenty
years on the question of calling a constitutional convention, and
further that in 1957 such a vote was taken after announcement by
Governor Harriman that the most urgent constitutional reform
needed was "to elect one house of the legislature on the basis of
population to give big cities fuller representation." Although the
ten most populous counties contain 73.5 percent of the citizen
population of the state, the vote was against the call. Were the
call to issue, three delegates would be chosen from each senate
district, and fifteen from the state at large. This means, says Judge
Levet, that at a constitutional convention the ten most populous
counties might well control.
As to geography, the court thought that the very large size of
some of the up-state New York counties, contrasted with the small
size and high concentration of population in the counties in New
York City, created problems militating against apportionment
on a strict population basis. The choices become whether one increases the total number of assemblymen-already 150-to the
point of making discussion less productive, or creates districts so
large that the representative loses touch with his constituents.200
Finally, Judge Levet reiterated the presumptions against the
invalidity of state laws and constitutions, suggesting that it must
be a plain case in which a federal court will act to invalidate such
prov1s1ons.
Judge Ryan wrote a brief separate opinion concurring in the
findings of fact and conclusions of law stated by Judge Levet, and
concluding that the court has jurisdiction, that this jurisdiction
has been exercised, "and, after trial and examination of the statutes involved ... the complaint herein should be dismissed upon
its merits." 291 Judge Waterman also concurred in Judge Levet's
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and with his colleagues in
dismissing the complaint on the merits.292
This leaves W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon ready for the Supreme
Court. At least everyone has agreed that it was disposed of on
the merits-every judge on the three-judge court felt the necessity
to state this fact explicitly. Appeal lies directly to the Supreme
290
291
202

Id. at 379.
Id. at 385.
Ibid.
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Court. The case has not been frozen in the lower court like Baker
v. Carr. It seems probable, therefore, that before final settlement
of the latter, the Simon case will reach the Supreme Court. If the
district court is upheld in its determination that there is no unconstitutional discrimination in New York, the minimum representation formula may rapidly become the universal pattern. It
should be noted that, while there is a large top-to-bottom variation
in ratio in New York, the urban voters have a majority of seats
in both houses, and the rural bias is not very great. New York
City, for instance, has a population which constitutes 46.0 percent of the population of the state; it elects 43.3 percent of the
total number of assemblymen, and 43.l percent of the total number of senators. The ten most populous counties in the state, with
73.5 percent of the citizen population, elect 65.5 percent of the
senators, and 62.0 percent of the assemblymen. The complaint is
not in the nature of a challenge to rural domination, but an urban
attempt to increase a majority on the theory that direct proportion
to population is required. How far differences could be stretched
by minimum representation and fall within the reach of the Simon
decision is doubtful. In Tennessee, for instance, where there are
ninety-five counties, and the constitution places a limit of ninetynine on the number of representatives, the application of a minimum representation of one representative per county would leave
only four to be distributed on a population basis. In New York, on
the other hand, there are only sixty-two counties and there are 150
assemblymen, leaving eighty-eight to be distributed among the
more heavily populated counties.
The Simon court was much less concerned about individual
differences than was the district court in Tennessee on the Baker
remand. While the latter found that a difference of four to one
in the population of single districts demonstrated invidious geographical discrimination,293 the New York federal district court
passed off a two-to-one difference in the number of persons residing
in the largest and smallest senate district with the following remark: "No proof was submitted by plaintiffs that the senatorial
districts, aside from some variance in citizen population were otherwise subject to criticism. The system is not irrational. It clearly
gives weight to population within the state's counties which forms
a basis for the ingredient of area, accessibility and character of
interest,"294 and held rational and valid a lower house apportion203

!!04

Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
W.M.C.A:-;-Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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ment in which the difference in population between the largest
and smallest district was fourteen to one.
VI.

OTHER REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICT COURT CASES:

INTO THE THICKET WITH ABACUS AND PRUNING

HooK

A. Trilogy in Georgia
First of the post-Baker filings was Sanders v. Gray.205 Like Cook
v. Fortson (Turman v. Duckworth),296 South v. Peters,297 Cox v.
Peters,298 and Hartsfield v. Sloan,299 it was brought to challenge the
validity of the Georgia county unit system. The case was filed, it
is said, within half an hour after the decision in Baker v. Carr was
announced. It was heard by a three-judge court consisting of
Judges Bell, Hooper, and Tuttle.
The treatment of the Georgia county unit cases by the Baker
Court has already been discussed. The Brennan opinion refers to
these cases as involving a refusal to use equity's powers. The
Douglas opinion leaves them all to Brennan. The Clark opinion
treats them as having demonstrated the policy of abstaining from
interference where the system is rational. The Stewart opinion
does not mention them at all. And the Frankfurter and Harlan
opinions treat the cases as still good law. At the very outside, then,
it cannot be said that Baker can stand as a precedent rejecting
South v. Peters as applied to its precise facts.
While the Sanders case was in gremio legis, the Georgia legislature acted to ameliorate to a considerable extent the rural bias
built into the county unit system. The original six-four-two formula was abandoned and Fulton County was given forty unit
votes, Dekalb, twenty, Chatham, sixteen, down to two apiece for
the smallest ninety-seven counties.
The court stated that it took the decision in Baker v. Carr
as adopting the test stated in Mr. Justice Douglas's dissenting
opinion in South v. Peters, that "where nominations are made in
primary elections, there shall be no inequality in voting power by
reason of race, creed, color, or other invidious discrimination." 300
This prompted test number two. "Having applied the equal pro203 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ga. 1962) [for later history, see note 300 infra].
329 U.S. 675 (1946).
339 U.S. 276 (1950).
20s 342 U.S. 936 (1952).
299 357 U.S. 916 (1958).
soo See Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 168 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated and Temanded,
31 U.S.L. WEEK 4285 (U.S. March 18, 1963), with the Supreme Court holding that the
equal protection clause required application of the "one person, one vote" principle to
statewide voting, but expressly indicating that its decision did not at all relate to state
legislative apportionment questions.
205

296
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tection clause ... we apply the test of invidious discrimination." 301
The unit system, it said, is not illegal qua unit system, but it must
not run "afoul of constitutional inhibitions." Step three is the formulation of a test for "invidiousness." The right of an individual,
said the court, must be related to the treatment of his county as
against the state as a whole, and he cannot complain of over-influence of some other county, but only under-influence of his
own. 302 This was said to be so because the state has a power to
"diffuse" political initiative, a power upheld in MacDougall v.
Green. 303 Another factor to be considered, said the court, is
whether there is a historical basis for the unit system. It went on
to find such a basis. A third consideration was said to be whether
or not there is a political remedy. It found that there was not. A
fourth factor is the relationship between federal and state governments under the Constitution. A federal court should not interfere
unless violation of the right is clear. 304 The test to be applied, concluded the court, is "the sum of all these factors." The application
of that sum appeared to the court to point to two conclusions:
first, "a unit system for use in a party primary is invidiously discriminatory if any unit has less than its share to the nearest whole
number proportionate to population, or to the whole of the vote
in a recent party gubernatorial primary or to the whole vote for
electors of the party in a recent presidential election"; and second,
"no discrimination is deemed to be invidious under the system if
the disparity against any county is not in excess of the disparity
that exists against any state in the most recent electoral college
allocation, or under the equal proportions formula for representation of the several states in the Congress, . . . provided it is adjusted to accord with changes in the basis at least once each ten
years." 305 The court indicated that it was aware of the fact that
it might be thought doctrinaire thus to state "definite standards,"
and said that it did so, "because, and only because, it is a question
of much public moment."
So after the Supreme Court refused four times to invalidate a
unit system with top-to-bottom variation of over one hundred to
one, the district court has held that thirteen to one is "afoul" the
Sanders v. Gray, supra note 300, at 168.
Ibid. Compare with this test that espoused by the district court in Baker v.
Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962), where it was said that the right violated was
a right not to be treated differently from citizens in the "irrationally favored counties."
Id. at 344.
303 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
304 Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 168-69 (N.D. Ga. 1962) (for later history, see
note 300 supra].
aor; Id. at 170.
301
302
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Constitution. The case is presently on appeal to the Supreme
Court and will offer a test of the revolutionary character of the
Baker decision. Plainly the district court found no irrationality
other than what it found to be an unfair differential. Like the district court in Tennessee in the Baker case on remand, it fixed the
limits of fairness within very narrow tolerances. In Baker, the
outer range of reasonableness was placed at a two-thirds fraction
rule. The Georgia district court was willing to go along with a
major fraction rule.
The second of the Georgia cases, Toombs v. Fortson, 306 tested
the apportionment of the state legislature. The Georgia constitution, like that in New York, provides for legislative apportionment
of the lower house according to a formula protecting the representation of smaller counties. The difference is, however, that the
Georgia house of representatives has 205 members and there are
159 counties. The formula allots to the eight largest counties three
representatives apiece, to the thirty next largest, two, and one each
to the remaining 121 counties. This results in a difference of ratio
of roughly one hundred to one.
Not only is the Georgia case distinguishable on the ground of
order of difference, but, unlike New York, Georgia had apportioned the senate without regard to population. The senate districts were in all but two cases groups of three counties, with each
district electing one senator. In all but two cases the law forbade
a senator to succeed himself or be succeeded by a resident of the
same county. Instead, each of the three counties in a district was
entitled to have one of its residents in the senate in every third
session. This was accomplished by holding the primary election
only in the county whose turn it was, though, in the general election, voting was throughout the district. Since senate districts were
each composed of the same number of counties, the rural bias in
the senate is substantially the same as it is in the house of representatives. Under the rotation system, counties due to have a
senator in the state's twenty-eight least populous districts, although representing only 6.13 percent of the state's population,
would elect a majority of the fifty-four member senate.
Following the same "sum" of tests employed in Sanders v.
Gray, the court held that the rotation system of electing senators
was unconstitutional, and that a representative system which does
not elect at least one house by population involved "invidious discrimination" under the equal protection clause. Whether or not
306

205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
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one house could be apportioned on a purely geographical basis
it did not feel obligated to say.307
As in Tennessee, relief proved to be a problem. During the
pendency of the Sanders case, the governor had called a special
session of the legislature and it had taken action on the unit
system. It had adjourned, however, without doing anything about
legislative apportionment. In its original opinion, written by
Judge Tuttle, and filed on May 25, 1962, the court indicated that
it would postpone further proceedings "until the State has had
a reasonable opportunity to reconstitute the Legislature so as to
meet the constitutional standards here laid down prior to the
January, 1963, session." 308 In mid-July nothing had been done to
correct the abuses pointed out by the court, and it rendered a
second opinion to clarify the first. 309 This opinion, delivered by
Judge Bell, and joined in by Judge Morgan, limited the effect of
the first opinion to a declaration of the invalidity of the rotation
system in the senate and the unconstitutionality of a system in
which neither house is apportioned by population, with an indication that if nothing is done to achieve a system in conformity with
those standards by January 1963, the court would have a duty to
take such action as would be necessary to afford plaintiffs their
rights. The court did not decide, said Judge Bell, that the legislature would not have any legal status after January. On the contrary, "its present status will continue until changed." 310 Judge
Tuttle dissented from this clarifying opinion. He indicated that
what the court intended to say and, so far as he knew, still intends
to say, is that "unless at least one House of the Georgia Legislature
is reconstituted so as to represent the people of the State according to population by January I, 1963, no legally constituted Legislature of the State of Georgia will then be in existence or thereafter be in existence." 311
Just what method of reapportionment could be resorted to
after January I, 1963, Judge Tuttle does not explain. Presumably
he was of the opinion that, after the seven-month period of grace,
the court would in some fashion act directly "to accord plaintiffs
their rights." This threat was one which Judge Tuttle had delivered
from the bench. On his invitation to express contrary views, his
Ibid.
Id. at 259.
Toombs v. Fortson, Civil No. 7883, N.D. Ga., July 13, 1962 (memorandum opinion
filed with order).
310 Id. at 2.
311 Id. at 3.
307
308
300
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brothers Bell and Morgan had expressed none, and Judge Tuttle
shows some pique at their later disassociation from his view of
the matter. His position is strange, inasmuch as one would expect
that in a case in which relief is one of the major problems, the
court would not act to limit the avenues of possible action until
it was forced to. The presence of a sitting legislature, for example,
widens the possibilities for equitable pressures. Perhaps Judge
Tuttle thought that the present threat of chaos in January would
effect action and that the court's failure to back up its threat would
encourage foot-dragging. 312
The third volume in the Georgia trilogy is Wesberry v. Vandiver.313 This case rounded out the effort to test the application
of Baker v. Carr3 14 to all the types of apportionment sustained
in the thirty years of litigation preceding the Baker case. It was
filed to challenge the constitutionality of the Georgia congressional
apportionment, raising again the same issues which were before
the Supreme Court in Wood v. Broom315 and Colegrove v. Green. 316
First the court applied to congressional apportionment the
test it had worked out in the unit rule and legislative apportionment cases. It pointed out that the act in question was enacted in
1931, following the loss by Georgia of two seats in the House of
Representatives. Though the districts created by that act varied
in population from a high of 396,112 to a low of 218,496, the
court could not say that it thought the plan at that time arbitrary.
It stated that the 1931 act created districts which "reflected a
rational state policy to set up the congressional districts in Georgia
with some reasonable relation to population." It continued to
say that "on the other hand it now reflects a system which has become arbitrary through inaction when considered in the light of
the present population of the Fifth District and as measured by
any conceivable reasonable standard." 317
In the congressional situation, however, the court felt that
judicial intervention should await the passing of a reasonable time
to allow "normal state governmental processes" to correct the
312 On September 27, 1962, the Governor of Georgia called the legislature into
extraordinary session, and, on October 5, 1962, the legislature enacted legislation reapportioning the state senate. Under the scheme there adopted, urban counties are
given twenty-three of the fifty-four seats in the senate, with twelve allotted to metropolitan Atlanta. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT IN
THE STATES (1962 & Supp. I, 1963).
313 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
314 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
315 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
316 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
317 Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276,282 (N.D. Ga. 1962).

1963]

LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT

791

alleged abuses. Tested by the fourteenth amendment and article
I, section 2, rights of the plaintiffs, the court suggested that it
would decline to find invidiousness at the present time, but would
retain jurisdiction until a reasonable time had been afforded a
reapportioned General Assembly to reapportion congressional
seats. 318
The court did not do this, however, for it read the Colegrove
case as bringing into the congressional apportionment problem
the role of Congress. Colegrove, as applied to congressional apportionment, the court took to be binding. It was cited as
authority in cases in which there was only "state action," and perhaps, in view of Baker v. Carr, is no longer binding in such cases.
In the area of congressional apportionment, however, the court
did not take Baker v. Carr to repudiate its holding, particularly
since it was expressly preserved in the previous term in Gomillion
v. Lightfoot.319 In view of these considerations, the court felt that
the complaint should be dismissed for want of equity "to the extent that no cognizable constitutional claim is presented under the
facts and subsisting authorities." 320
Judge Tuttle disagreed with the majority in their view that
Colegrove v. Green was preserved in Baker v. Carr. He would have
denied relief on the ground that political remedies were available through a reapportioned legislature, but would have retained
jurisdiction over the cause in order to grant relief if political
processes should prove unavailing. 321
B. Sims v. Frink:
The Alabama Do-It-Yourself Apportionment Kit
The Alabama apportionment situation was closely analogous
to that in Tennessee. The state constitution provided for legislative apportionment according to population. As in Tennessee,
the last Alabama reapportionment had taken place in 190 I. In
Sims v. Frink322 a suit was brought before a three-judge court to
reap the rewards promised by Baker v. Carr. The court took as
conceded that the apportionment in both house and senate under
the 1901 act embodied invidious discrimination. The General
Assembly was called into extraordinary session to forestall judicial intervention and adopted two pieces of legislation. The first
318
310
320
321
322

Ibid.
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276, 286 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
Ibid.
208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
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was a temporary or "stand-by" legislative apportionment act alleviating to some extent the "glaring discrepancies."323 The second
was a proposed constitutional amendment which would create a
senate of sixty-seven members, one from each of the sixty-seven
counties in the state. 324 The house, on the other hand, would be
apportioned on the basis of population. Since the proposed
amendment to the constitution of Alabama further required that
in distributing representatives by population every county should
be given at least one representative, the court read the proposal
as providing less than mathematical proportion to population.
It went on to say that, although there had been some suggestions
in the district court cases since Baker v. Carr that a system in
which the apportionment of one house is based on population
and the other is based on geography might meet muster, where
the detailed provisions of the local constitution, as in Alabama,
make exact apportionment by population impossible in either
house, the result may well be to require at least some attention
to population in both. 325 In view of the detailed requirements of
the proposed constitutional amendment, making exact proportion impossible in the house, it ruled that the proposal for a one
county-one senator senate would be unconstitutional. The proposal for distribution of the seats in the house it felt was within
constitutional limits, however.
The stand-by statute was declared unconstitutional in that its
provisions for the distribution of house seats embodied invidious
discrimination, and, further, that it was to take effect only after
November, when the people were to vote on the proposed constitutional amendment. The court seemed to feel that since it
had declared that the acts proposing the amendments were unconstitutional, an act to take effect after the date set for their
submission would be unconstitutional as a needless delay in
affording the plaintiffs their constitutional rights. 326
Having declared the stand-by act and the act proposing the
constitutional amendment unconstitutional, the court was left
with no governing provisions at all. It thereupon simply issued
an order adopting its own apportionment plan to be effective
323 Alabama House Bill 59, Extraordinary Session, 1962, known as "Crawford-Webb
Act." The text of the act is reproduced as appendix C to the court's opinion; see Sims
v. Frink, supra note 322, at 445.
324 Alabama Senate Bill 29, Extraordinary Session, 1962, known as "67 Senator
Amendment." The text of the proposed amendment is set out as appendix B to the
court's opinion; see Sims v. Frink, supra note 322, at 443.
325 Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. at 439.
326 Id. at 441.
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immediately, but subject to the power of the present legislature
to supersede it with legislation enacted before the next elections.327
The court took the stand-by act provision for senate apportionment and the plan embodied in the proposed constitutional
amendment for apportionment of the house of representatives,
and incorporated them in its order. Thus a federal court has
declared half of a state constitutional amendment unconstitutional before it was adopted, and adopted the other half for the
people of the state before it was voted on.
The court did not take the system it adopted to be a full
measure of absence of invidiousness. It quoted from Mr. Justice
Clark's Baker opinion to the effect that perhaps the courts could
correct some of the egregious discrepancies and thereby break
the stranglehold. Jurisdiction was retained for the purpose of examining the action of the next legislature in adopting a permanent
system consistent with constitutional principles. To add insult
to injury, costs were taxed to the defendants. 328

C. Moss v. Burkhart
Moss v. Burkhart was an action brought to force the Oklahoma legislature to apportion in consonance with Baker v. Carr.
The case was, as was stated by the district court, a sequel to
Radford v. Gary. 330 The alleged discrepancy between ratios of
representatives to those represented was approximately ten to
one. It will be remembered that in Radford the relief sought had
been mandamus to the governor to call the legislature, to the
legislature to reapportion, and, failing that, to the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma to do it for them. Mr. Justice Brennan had distinguished the case from that in Baker as controlled by "problems of relief." In Moss v. Burkhart the plaintiffs requested that
the court "proceed to enjoin the State Auditor, State Treasurer,
and Members of the Oklahoma Tax Commission from taking any
official actions on appropriations or enactments of those claiming to exercise legislative authority." 331 They added, however,
that if they be mistaken in the remedy sought, they be granted
such remedy as would relieve and cure the evils from which they
continued to suffer.
The Governor of Oklahoma appeared voluntarily and testi329

Id. at 442.
Perhaps under a theory of quantum meruit.
207 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962).
sao Id. at 887.
sa1 Ibid.
327
328
320
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fied to the effect that he was elected governor on a program to
reapportion the legislature, had recommended reapportionment
according to the constitutional mandate, and had sponsored an
initiative petition to effect reapportionment, but that it had been
defeated at the polls, and further that he had appeared as a
defendant and as an amicus curiae in cases before the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, had suggested modes of relief to that court, and
had offered to convene the legislature in special session if the
court would indicate its disposition to afford relief in the event
the legislature failed to act. This offer he repeated to the
federal district court in Moss. The court refused interlocutory
relief to give the legislature an opportunity to act. After hearing,
the court declared the Oklahoma constitutional provision limiting the number of legislators from one county to seven to be
null and void, and that the present apportionment statute was
also null and void, but made this ruling prospectively, with
effect upon "all future elections." 332
This ruling was handed down June 19, 1962, and the case
was continued to July 31, 1962, presumably to give the legislature an opportunity to act. When the court reconvened the
legislature had not acted. There was before it a motion to alter or
amend the decree and for a consideration of various remedies. The
motion was overruled, except that, by way of clarification of the
earlier order, the court said that it had not meant to indicate
that a general assembly elected in the November 6, 1962, election would not be legally constituted. Since the filing period for
the 1962 election had already begun when the interlocutory decree
was rendered, it would not be considered a "future election." 333
It then proceeded to set down "guidelines" for the 1963
session of the legislature. First, the state was to be apportioned
on a basis of substantial numerical equality, to the end that each
voter shall have approximately the same power and influence
in the election of members of the two houses. This, said Judge
Murrah, is in consonance with the intent and spirit of the Oklahoma constitution and the equal protection clause. He did not
say whether he read them separately or together. Second, the
house of representatives shall be apportioned according to the
requirements of the Oklahoma constitution, except that the
seven-member limit shall not be followed, it being found and
declared unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment; the
332
333

Id. at 898.
Ibid.
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said seven-seat limit being removed, Oklahoma and Tulsa counties are to have nineteen and fourteen legislative seats, respectively.
Third, the senate shall be apportioned according to the provisions of the Oklahoma constitution, except that, there being two
irreconcilable provisions therein, the court will prefer the one
which provides for exact equality. It then proceeded to allot the
proper portion to the single-county districts and state that the rest
shall be coupled in the way which will give them as nearly as possible equal population, and compactness and contiguity. 334
On the surface, Judge Murrah's opinion seems to indicate that
it is the court's duty not only to force apportionment consistent
with the fourteenth amendment, but to require a full observance
of the provisions of the Oklahoma constitution as well. The fact
that he found the seven-member limit unconstitutional, however,
may indicate that he believed the Baker case to require absolute
numerical equality. This does not necessarily follow, for he may
be of the opinion that the seven-member limit fails to meet the
test of the equal protection clause, and, with the offending clause
being struck from the Oklahoma constitution, that instrument
requires absolute uniformity in both houses. In view of the insistence of the majority of the Baker Court that it was not being
called upon to enforce provisions of the state constitution, Judge
Murrah's position is a strange one. It does have the advantage of
providing a standard, however. If he is holding that absolute
equality is required in both houses, certainly his opinion is not
even consistent with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Douglas
in his concurring opinion in Baker v. Carr.
Like the district court in Tennessee, Judge Murrah and his
brethren are left at "ducks and drakes" until the Summer of 1963.
He suggested that if there is no acceptable legislative apportionment statute forthcoming, he will proceed to direct methods.

D. Sobel v. Adams
The Florida apportionment was further from being proportional to population than most, a member of the lower house
from Gilchrist County representing 2,868 voters, and one from
Dade County, 311,000, a difference of over one hundred to one.
The suit was brought in the United States district court and heard
by a three-judge panel. The court had little trouble in coming
to the conclusion that the apportionment of the house of representatives was in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
334

Id. at 898-99.
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It also indicated that it considered that proposed constitutional
amendments would be unconstitutional, but declined to enjoin
their submission. Finally, it declared the house apportionment
act "null, void, and prospectively inoperative," and continued the
case until August 13, 1962.335 The following day the governor
called the legislature into extraordinary session, and it withdrew
the proposed amendments and substituted one which provided a
scheme for the house of representatives under which each county
would have one representative and the remainder would be apportioned according to population. The senate would be composed of forty-six districts, each district to elect one senator. Each
of the twenty-four most populous counties would constitute a
district, and the other twenty-two districts would be composed
from the remaining forty-three counties.336 To implement the
provisions of the proposed constitutional amendment, the legislature enacted two statutes, one making an apportionment of the
house of representatives in accordance with the formula set out
in the proposed amendment,337 and the other making provision
for senatorial districts of the number specified by the same amendment. 338
The court, per Judge Jones, held that, if the amendment is
adopted in November 1962, the state will have provided for a
rational system of apportionment. 339 Judge Jones rejected the
suggestion that the equal protection clause required precise numerical equality in districts in either house of the legislature. In
the house of representatives he felt it perfectly rational to preserve
minimum geographical representation by requiring that each
county have at least one representative. The senate districts, he
suggested, might seem at first to be a crazy quilt but on closer
examination to follow overall rational lines. He laid emphasis upon
the fact that the Florida legislature enacts a great deal of local
legislation and for that reason it was sensible to have no more
than three counties to a single senator. The case was continued
with the statement that, if the amendment is ratified, the cause
will be moot and will be dismissed.
Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316, 318 (S.D. Fla. 1962).
Fla. Legis., H.R.J. Res. 30-X, Ex. Sess. (1962), found in FLA. STAT. ANN. art. 7,
§§ 1-6 (1962); see Sobel v. Adams, supra note 335, at 319.
337 See Sobel v. Adams, supra note 335, at 319.
338 Id. at 320.
339 On November 6, 1962, this proposed amendment was rejected at the polls.
Thereupon the governor issued a call for a special session of the legislature. The session
convened on November 9 and sat until November 27. No apportionment legislation was
adopted, but a special study committee was formed to make recommendations to the
new general assembly when it convenes in regular session on April 8, 1963.
335
336
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E. Lisco v. McNichols
This case involved a suit to enjoin enforcement of the Colorado
legislative apportionment statutes. 340 It was brought against the
governor of the state, the state treasurer, and the General Assembly. They answered, challenged the jurisdiction of the court, and
asserted their immunity from suit. The court found that it did
have jurisdiction and that the suit was not against the state. It
found, further, that the present Colorado apportionment did not
meet with the requirements of the equal protection clause, that
is to say that it is characterized by invidious discrimination against
those living in districts with a large population. The court noted,
however, that the primary election was scheduled for September
11-it then being August I 0-and that the case had been tried
in less than two days, affording no opportunity to explore various
modes of relief. Under the circumstances, the court felt that it
should grant no injunction but should stay action until an indefinite date in the future, giving the 1963 legislature an opportunity to act.

VII.

THE STATE COURT CASES

The role of the state courts in the efforts to keep apportionment plans current has often been commented upon. Suffice it
to say that none of the Supreme Court cases announcing the nonjusticiability rule or holding against the existence of federal rights
in any way limited or defined the state courts' powers to grant
relief to correct abuses under the state constitutions. It has
already been pointed out that in Illinois the state supreme court
enjoined the expenditure of state funds in the holding of an election under an invalid apportionment statute. 341 Other state courts
have fashioned other modes of relief. 342 Many of the state courts,
however, have followed the course of the Supreme Court in its
refusal to intervene. 343 This refusal generally has been grounded
on the absence of power to grant relief, since in many instances
the violation of the state constitution has been too plain for argumentation. The question raised by the Baker case with respect
to these decisions is whether the announcement that an invidious
discrimination based upon residence of the voter constitutes a
violation of the federal constitution has the effect of conferring
340
341
342
343

Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471 (D. Colo. 1962).
See Moran v. Bowley, 374 Ill. 148, 179 N.E. 526 (1932).
See, e.g., Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960).
See generally SEARS, METHODS OF REAPPORTIONMENT (1952).
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jurisdiction on state courts to deal with their legislatures in a
way in which they had previously decided was ultra vires. If the
effect of the Baker decision is to confer such jurisdiction, a second
problem remains. If the state court may now act to require conformance to the minimal standards of the equal protection clause,
may it take as its gauge of fairness the provisions of the state constitution where those provisions are more strict than those required
by the equal protection clause?
The problem is touched upon in Stein v. General Assembly,344
a case brought in the state courts in Colorado after the Supreme
Court decision in Baker v. Carr. In the Stein case a suit was
brought in the Supreme Court of Colorado seeking a prerogative
or remedial writ: first, ordering the General Assembly to convene
for the purpose of reapportioning the seats in the legislature; second, requiring the governor to convene the legislature for such
purpose; third, prohibiting the secretary of state from "permitting
the conduct of elections or certifying to office any person as elected
to the General Assembly until there be such reapportionment ...";
and fourth, prohibiting the state treasurer from paying to any
member of the General Assembly any of the emoluments of his
office until there be reapportionment as provided by the constitution of Colorado. The gravamen of the Stein case is the failure of
the Colorado legislature to reapportion the state under the requirements of the constitution of Colorado. The constitutional provision
required apportionment based upon population, and its validity
was not at issue. The Colorado legislature was last apportioned
in 1953. The constitution provided that apportionment should
take place in 1885, "and every tenth year thereafter; and at the
session next following such enumeration, and also at the session
following an enumeration made by the authority of the United
States...." 345 The complaint stated that the governor had certified the census figures to the legislature in 1961, and in 1962,
and at both sessions the legislature had failed to act. Between
1950 and 1960, Colorado had increased its population by 32.4
percent, urban population increasing by 55.5 percent, while rural
population showed a decline of 6.6 percent. As a result, it was
urged, there existed in 1962 an unconstitutional irrational preference for urban voters. Justice Day, speaking for three members of
the seven-man court, began by saying that it should be made clear
that the Supreme Court of Colorado could not and would not
344 374 P .2d 66 (Colo. 1962).
345 CoLO. CoNST. art. V, § 45.
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order the governor to do anything, "the doing of which lies within
his sound discretion," and further that the court was of the opinion
that the calling of special sessions of the legislature was such a
prerogative. It went on to say in like fashion that the court could
not grant the relief sought against either the state treasurer or the
secretary of state. Justice Day thought, however, that the fact that
the plaintiff might have misconceived his remedy would not divest
the court of jurisdiction.346 On the merits, the court held that the
state constitution required apportionment during the odd-numbered year following the census so that on the facts the legislature
was not as yet derelict in its duty. It stated, however, that the
apportionment was discriminatory and retained jurisdiction.
There were two dissents, each of interest, but for different
reasons. On the subject of state court remedies, Justice Hall,
noting the requested relief, was of the opinion that the court,
having come to the conclusion that none of the majority was ready
to afford any of the remedies sought, should dismiss the suit. 347
He considered all of them to be beyond the powers delegated to
the judiciary. Since he felt that the majority had in effect held
that the time for legislative action had not arrived, it was unbecoming of the court to retain jurisdiction, and those persons
charged with constitutional and statutory duties "are entitled to
go about [their] performance . . . untrammelled by threats or
warnings from this court, no matter how hollow or impotent they
may be." Justice Moore, on the other hand, saw a violation of
the Constitution of the United States under the Baker doctrine,
and believed that whenever such a violation is shown to exist, it
is not within the power of the state to postpone correction because
of any variety of "state action." 348 This view of the matter appears
to suggest that decennial apportionment requirements themselves
cannot be justified as reasonable where great shifts take place in
a shorter time, a view which is in sharp contrast to the view of
the federal district court in New York which suggested that the
provision of the law of that state calling for a vote every twenty
years on whether a constitutional convention shall be held established a political corrective to be weighed in determining whether
or not a court should intervene.
On the subject of jurisdiction, the Colorado court had no
doubts, but it may be doubted that this was the result of Baker v.
346
347
348

374 P.2d 66, 67 (Colo. 1962).
Id. at 81.
Id. at 73.

800

MICHIGAN

LAw

REVIEW

[Vol. 61

Carr, for as early as 1934 it had taken jurisdiction to test the validity of apportionment legislation, holding the act of that year
unconstitutional.
These same doubts about power to afford equitable relief are
to be seen in Sweeney v. Notte,349 in Rhode Island. There a suit
was brought to challenge the validity of a legislative apportionment of the Rhode Island house of representatives under a constitutional provision requiring that at least one representative be
given to each of the municipalities in the state. The legislature of
Rhode Island, like that of Colorado, had failed to reapportion on
the basis of the 1960 census. The court found that discrepancies
in representation ratio were as great as four to one. It also found,
however, that there was no way to achieve equal apportionment
in the house of representatives consistent with the provisions of
the constitution requiring representation of the municipalities and
limiting the number of seats to one hundred.350 It was troubled
by the possibility that it might declare that the General Assembly
had a duty to apportion under the existing provisions, only to find
out later that these requirements violate the United States Constitution. It took the bit in its teeth and held that strict adherence
to both the municipality representation and the one hundredmember limit would make a constitutionally valid apportionment
impossible, but declined to direct the General Assembly as to
which it should follow. As to relief, the court said:
"In the absence of constitutional warrant to the contrary this
court has no authority to require the general assembly to
meet in special session, nor to require the governor to exercise his constitutional prerogative to call such a session. Furthermore, we are not persuaded that our obligation to resolve
the justiciable issues herein considered is so broad as to require us to hold that the superior court would be warranted
in supervising reapportionment of the house of representatives. . . .''351
It stated further that it felt obligated to say that if the legislature
183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962).
This view was repeated in Opinion to the Governor, 183 A.2d 806 (R.I. 1962).
The constitutional provision in question required 1% representation of the state's
thirty-nine municipalities. The court gave its opinion that there was no way of conforming to this provision and to the 100-member limit while satisfying the requirements
of the equal protecton clause. The best that could be done under the provision would
result in a minimum difference in ratio of between four to one and twenty-two to one,
"which in our opinion would be so unjustly discriminatory as to be invidious." Id. at
807.
351 183 A.2d 296, 303 (1962).
349

350
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did not reapportion the state, some federal court would probably
do it for them.
Justice Roberts concurred in an opinion in which he said
that he thought the court had gone pretty far in considering the
provisions of the state constitution. He thought the proper function of the court was to declare the legislature's duty to reapportion under the constitutional mandate and leave the validity of
that provision for later litigation. 352
CONCLUSIONS

Although the reactions have varied from huzzahs to Minie
balls, this generation has learned to live with a Supreme Court
which has defined its function as including reform as well as enforcement of the community's standard of minimum fair treatment. At the very least it can be expected that the concept of
fairness will change over the years, and we are accustomed to
having such changes reflected in a shifting construction of the
constitutional phrases "due process" and "equal protection."
There is nothing very revolutionary, then, in finding that the
Court will inquire into allegations of arbitrary discrimination
based upon a person's place of residence. Nor is there much that
is surprising in a holding that this will be so in cases dealing with
matters of franchise; the fifteenth amendment cases have schooled
us to think it normal for courts to interfere in such matters.
The United States, like other nations around the world, has
found no answer to the question, "How 'ya gonna keep 'em down
on the farm?," and mid-twentieth century finds us primarily an
urban nation. It is not surprising, then, that the Court should
investigate such discrimination at the instance of urban dwellers,
constituting, as they do, some sixty-nine percent of the population,
well-organized, and loud. Matters of constitutional right are ruled
no doubt partly by pity, but partly by noise.
The most disturbing feature of the apportionment cases is the
fact that beneath the surface of every one of these cases, and not
very far beneath at that, lies a partisan political struggle. There is
no doubt that from first to last these cases have been brought
to challenge the validity of a system which accords concentrated
urban populations less representation than they would receive
were representatives allotted on the basis of population alone.
352 Id. at 304. Justice Roberts stated: "The courts of this state, in my opinion,
are without power, inherent or conferred, to apportion the house of representatives
either directly or indirectly by resort to the equity jurisdiction." Ibid.
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The problem has never been one of whimsical or irrational allocation, or discrimination against individuals because they live at
a particular intersection between meridian and parallel. The residents of Memphis care not at all whether Moore County, Tennessee, is given a single representative or coupled in a fioterial district
with Coffee County, unless perhaps they think that one solution
or another will make it more probable that the district will return
a member of the Memphis political stamp. The contest is not
between people living in one area or another; it is between Democrats and Republicans.
Courts are themselves frequently in need of protection from
partisan politics, and for this reason traditionally they have kept
out of partisan struggles. They have said to the politician, ''I'll
stay out of your arena, and you keep your gladiators out of my
court room." This has not always been so, and in some states we
still retain political elections of judges, but in the federal judicial
system this detachment from politics has been thought of as an
aid in maintaining an honest, impartial, and independent judicial
establishment. A political judicial branch will be politically
curbed, and should be. As long as we view courts as arbiters of
disputes between individuals, and protectors of individuals against
oppression by the state, it is sensible to want judges of fair mind
and independence. When courts undertake to manipulate and
control the processes for selection of the politician, what is more
natural than for the politician to marshal his resources for controlling the selection of the judge? It is true, of course, that political connections are not at the present time an inconsiderable
feature of judicial appointment; it is not, however, a feature
which most thinking people wish to see grow.
A second disturbing feature of judicial embroilment in matters
of this sort is the absence of any ready yardstick for measuring the
right asserted. It is all very well to stand ready to protect citizens
from clear abuses of rights or, as Mr. Justice Clark says, from the
operation of systems without any logical justification. Since in
representation geography is obviously a secondary device, under
which there is an untold number of political alignments and crossalignments fitted together by bargain, it is in a rare case, indeed,
that, by standing aside and looking at the system, one can tell
whether it is a "crazy quilt" or an authentic "action painting."
The experience thus far with the district court decisions applying the Baker case illustrates the problem. There have been
almost as many views of what equal treatment is as there have
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been courts which have considered the matter, and frequently
the members of a single court have had widely diverging views.
As one would suspect, they cluster around three positions. The
first, consonant with the views already expressed here, is that
mere difference is not enough, and that, where the court can think
of possible benign motives for the differences, it should not interfere. A second position is that substantially equal representation
of geographical units according to population is required in one
house of the legislature, but geographical representation without
regard to population may be employed in the other. The third
position is that representation in both houses must be governed
by standards of equal representation, insofar as it is possible to
achieve equality among the geographical areas forming the units
for representation. Because of the disruption these cases have
threatened, many states have proceeded to try to meet the requirements laid down, without waiting for final determination by
the Supreme Court of the standards to be employed. In some
quarters this may appear to be a victory for intervention, since
it avoids the problems of affording any positive relief. It may be,
however, that in some cases systems of representation perfectly
consonant with the equal protection clause, as the subject right
will evolve through subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court,
will have been given up and, because of the shifts in power resulting from the changes forced under threat by the courts, will
be irretrievable. The new system may, of course, be better--or
worse. In either case, it is difficult to agree with the propriety
of effecting such changes through judicial duress.
The third criticism which may be warranted goes to judicial
method. Though the bar and the public are conditioned to change
in the definition of constitutional rights, the judgment of courts
is entitled to respect largely because we view it as the product of
wisdom and reason. The Court is the agency which interprets
our history and tradition in light of present circumstances. Though
presumptions run against it, cases may arise in which a long series
of decisions, proceeding from an original faulty premise, have for
many years perpetuated a condition which the Court thinks antithetical to our true tradition. If the Court were ready to say that
the apportionment cases are of this sort, it could have said so.
Instead, it tortured the precedents beyond recognition and, without giving any guiding principles, invited the district courts to
entertain the welter of suits it must have anticipated-and on
the eve of primary elections in many states. In a nation with fast-
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growing urban populations, the substance and effect of the Court's
action will probably be popular, though ultimately it may complicate its existence and in the long run endanger its independence.
Its method, however, was more crafty than craftsmanlike, and cannot add to the prestige that comes from a reputation for honest
reading of the past coupled with sound and considered judgment
in applying past to present.
The manner of disposing of Baker, Scholle, and Simon, and
the spate of cases which Baker has brought, makes it certain that
the Court will have early and ample opportunity to attack the
task of framing guiding principles. It is to be hoped that it will
not be ducked by a dozen years of per curiam decisions citing
Baker v. Carr and, further, that the advantages of simplicity will
not prompt adoption of a standard of mathematical equality based
solely upon population, thus ending centuries of experimentation
with the design of democratic institutions which will accommodate within the same unit of government a wide variety of interest
groups without subjecting all to absolute domination by a close
majority which is geographically concentrated and highly organized.

